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Economic Analysis of Insurance Fraud
Pierre Picard
Abstract
We survey recent developments in the economic analysis of insurance fraud.
The paper rst sets out the two main approaches to insurance fraud that
have been developped in the literature, namely the costly state verication
and the costly state falsication. Under costly state verication, the insurer
can verify claims at some cost. Claimsverication may be deterministic or
random, and it can be conditioned on fraud signals perceived by insurers.
Under costly state falsication, the policyholder expends resources for the
building-up of his or her claim not to be detected. We also consider the
e¤ects of adverse selection, in a context where insurers cannot distinguish
honest policyholders from potential defrauders, as well as the consequences
of credibility constraints on anti-fraud policies. Finally, we focus attention
on the risk of collusion between policyholders and insurance agents or service
providers.
Keywords: Fraud, audit, verication, falsication, collusion, build-up.
JEL Classication Numbers: D80, G22
1 Introduction
Insurance fraud is a many-sided phenomenon1. Firstly, there are many di¤er-
ent degrees of severity in insurance fraud, going from build-up to the planned
criminal fraud, through opportunistic fraud. Furthermore, insurance fraud
refers primarily to the fact that policyholders may misreport the magnitude
of their losses2 or report an accident that never occured, but there is also
1See the chapter by Georges Dionne in this book on empirical evidence about insurance
fraud.
2Note that a claimant is not fraudulent if he relies in good faith on an erroneous val-
uation of an apparently competent third party see Clarke (1997) . However, insurance
may a¤ect fraud in markets for credence goods, i.e., markets where producers may provide
unnecessary services to comsumers who are never sure about the extent of the services
they actually need. See Darby and Karni (1973) on the denition of credence goods
1
fraud when a policyholder does not disclose relevant information when he
takes out his policy or when he deliberately creates further damages to in-
ate the size of claim. Lastly, insurance fraud may result from autonomous
decision-making of opportunist individuals, but often it goes through collu-
sion with a third party.
Since Becker (1968) and Stigler (1970), the analysis of fraudulent behav-
iors is part and parcel of economic analysis and there is a growing theoretical
literature dealing with insurance fraud. Making progress in this eld is all
the more important that combating insurance fraud is nowadays a major
concern of most insurance companies.
This survey of recent developments in the economic theory of insurance
fraud is organized as follows. Sections 24 set out the two main approaches
to insurance fraud that have been developed in the literature: the costly
state verication and the costly state falsication. Both approaches should
be considered as complementary. Under the costly state verication hypoth-
esis, the insurer can verify damages but he then incurs a verication (or
audit) cost. Under costly state falsication, the policyholder expends some
resources for the building-up of his or her claim not to be detected by the
insurer. In Section 2, we rst describe the general framework used in most
parts of our study, namely a model in which a policyholder has private in-
formation about the magnitude of his losses and who may le fraudulent
claims. We then turn to the analysis of costly state verication procedures
under deterministic auditing. In practice, claim handlers are, to some extent,
entrusted with claims verication but, more often than not, state verication
involves some degree of delegation. Indeed, there are specic agents, such as
experts, consulting physicians, investigators or attorneys who are in charge
of monitoring claims. Under deterministic auditing, claims are either veried
with certainty or not veried at all, according to the size of the claim. The
developments in the economic theory of insurance fraud surveyed in Sections
3 and 4 emphasize the fact that policyholders may engage in costly claims
falsication activities, possibly by colluding with a third party such as an
auto mechanic, a physician or an attorney. Section 3 remains within the
costly state verication approach. It is devoted to the analysis of audit cost
manipulation: policyholders may expend resources to make the verication
of damages more di¢ cult. Section 4 adresses the (stricto sensu) costly state
falsication approach: at some cost, policyholders are supposed to be able
to falsify the actual magnitude of their losses. In other words, they can take
acts that misrepresent the actual losses and then the claimsbuild up cannot
and Dionne (1984) on the e¤ects of insurance on the possibilities of fraud in markets for
credence goods.
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be detected. Sections 5 to 8 set out extensions of the costly state veri-
cation model in various directions. Section 5 focuses on random auditing.
Section 6 characterizes the equilibrium of a competitive insurance market
where trades are a¤ected by adverse selection because insurers cannot dis-
tinguish honest policyholders from potential defrauders. Section 7 focuses
on credibility constraints that a¤ect antifraud policies. Section 8 shows that
conditioning the decision to audit on fraud signals improves the e¢ ciency of
costly stae verication mechanisms and it makes a bridge between auditing
and scoring. Section 9 contemplates some indirect e¤ects of insurance con-
tracts on fraud. Sections 10 and 11 focus on collusion, respectively between
policyholders and agents in charge of marketing insurance contract in Section
10, and between policyholders and service providers in Section 11. Section
12 concludes. Proofs and references for proofs are gathered in an appendix.
2 Costly state verication: the case of deter-
ministic auditing
Identical insurance buyers own an initial wealthW and they face an uncertain
monetary loss x, where x is a random variable with a support [0; x] and a
cumulative distribution F (x). The no-loss outcome i.e., the no-accident
event may be reached with positive probability. Hence x is distributed
according to a mixture of discrete and continuous distributions: x has a
mass of probability f(0) at x = 0 and there is a continuous probability
density function f(x) = F 0(x) over (0; x]. In other words f(x)=[1   f(0)] is
the density of damages conditional on a loss occurring.
The insurance policy species the (non negative) payment t(x) from the
insurer to the policyholder if the loss is x and the premium P paid by the
policyholder. The realization of x is known only to the policyholder unless
there is verication, which costs c to the insurer.
For the time being, we assume that the insurer has no information at
all about the loss su¤ered by the policyholder unless he veries the claim
through an audit, in which case he observes the loss perfectly.3 We will
later on consider alternative assumptions, namely the case where the insurer
has partial information about the loss su¤ered (he can costlessly observe
whether an accident has occurred but not the magnitude of the loss) and the
case where the claim is a fasied image of true damages.
The policyholders nal wealth is Wf = W   P   x+ t(x). Policyholders
3On imperfect auditing, in contexts which are di¤erent from insurance fraud, see Baron
and Besanko (1984) and Puelz and Snow (1997).
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are risk-averse. They maximize the expected utility of nal wealth EU(Wf ),
where U(:) is a twice di¤erentiable von Neumann-Morgenstern utility func-
tion, with U 0 > 0, U 00 < 0.
A deterministic auditing policy species whether a claim is veried or not
depending on the magnitude of damages. More precisely, following Townsend
(1979), we dene a deterministic audit policy as a verication setM  [0; x],
with complement M c, that species when there is to be verication. A
policyholder who experiences a loss x may choose to le a claim bx. If bx 2M ,
the claim is audited, the loss x is observed and the payment is t(x). Ifbx 2 M c, the claim is not audited and the payment to the policyholder is
t(bx).
A contract  = ft(:);M; Pg is said to be incentive compatible if the poli-
cyholder truthfully reveals the actual loss, i.e., if bx = x is an optimal strategy
for the policyholder. Lemma 1 establishes that any contract is weakly domi-
nated4 by an incentive compatible contract, in which the payment is constant
in the no-verication set M c and always larger in the verication set than in
the no-verication set.
Lemma 1 Any contract  = ft(:);M; Pg is weakly dominated by an incen-
tive compatible contract e = fet(:);fM; ePg such that :
et(x) = t0 if x 2 fM c;et(x) > t0 if x 2 fM;
where t0 is some constant.
The characterization of the incentive compatible contracts described in
Lemma 1 is quite intuitive. In the rst place, truthful revelation of the actual
loss is obtained by paying a constant indemnity in the no-verication set, for
otherwise the policyholder would always report the loss corresponding to the
highest payment in this region. Secondly, if the payment were lower for some
level of loss located in the verication set than in the no-verication set, then,
for this level of loss, the policyholder would announce falsely that his loss is
in the no-verication set.5
4Dominance is in a Pareto-sense with respect to the expected utility of the policyholder
and to the expected prot of the insurer.
5If both payments were equal, then it would be welfare improving not to audit the
corresponding level of loss in the verication region and simultaneously to decrease the
premium. Note that Lemma 1 could be presented as a consequence of the Revelation
Principle (see Myerson, 1979).
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Lemma 1 implies that we may restrict our characterization of optimal
contracts to such incentive compatible contracts. This is proved by deninget(x) as the highest indemnity payment that the policyholder can obtain when
his loss is x, by choosing fM as the subset of [0; x] where the indemnity is
larger than the minimum and by letting eP = P . This is illustrated in Figure
1, with M = (x; x];fM = (x; x];et(x) = t0 if x  x and et(x) = t(x) if
x > x. Under , for any optimal reporting strategy the policyholder receives
t0 when x  x and he receives t(x) when x > x, which corresponds to
the same payment as under e. Furthermore, under , any optimal strategybx(x) is such that bx(x) 2 M if x > x, which implies that verication is
at least as frequent under  (for any optimal reporting strategy) as when
the policyholder tells the truth under e. Thus,  and e lead to identical
indemnity payments whatever the true level of the loss and expected audit
costs are lower when there is truthtelling under e than under .
From now on, we restrict ourselves to such incentive compatible contracts.
The optimal contract maximizes the policyholders expected utility
EU =
Z
M
U(W   P   x+ t(x))dF (x) +
Z
Mc
U(W   P   x+ t0)dF (x); (1)
with respect to P; t0; t(:) :M  ! R+ and M  [0; x], subject to a constraint
that requires the expected prot of the insurer E to meet some minimum
preassigned level normalized at zero
E = P  
Z
M
[t(x) + c]dF (x) +
Z
Mc
t0dF (x)  0; (2)
and to the incentive compatibility constraint
t(x) > t0 for all x in M: (3)
Figure 1
Lemma 2 For any optimal contract, we have
t(x) = x  k > t0 for all x in M;
and
M = (m;x] with m 2 [0; x]:
Lemma 2 shows that it is optimal to verify the claims that exceed a thresh-
old m and also to provide full insurance of marginal losses when x > m. The
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intuition of these results are as follows. The optimal policy shares the risk
between the insured and the insurer without inducing the policyholder to
misrepresent his loss level. As shown in Lemma 1, this incentive compat-
ibility constraint implies that optimally the indemnity schedule should be
minimal and at outside the verication set, which means that no insurance
of marginal losses is provided in this region. On the contrary, nothing pre-
vents the insurer to provide a larger variable coverage when the loss level
belongs to the verication set. Given the concavity of the policyholders
utility function, it is optimal to o¤er the at minimal coverage when losses
are low and to provide a larger coverage when losses are high. This leads
us to dene the threshold m that separates the verication set and its com-
plement. Furthermore, conditionally on the claim being veried, i.e., when
x > m, sharing the risk optimally implies that full coverage of marginal losses
should be provided.
Hence, the optimal contract maximizes
EU =
Z m
0
U(W   x  P + t0)dF (x) + [1  F (m)]U(W   P   k);
with respect to P;m  0; t0  0 and k  t0  m subject to
E = P   t0F (m) 
Z x
m+
(c+ x  k)dF (x)  0:
At this stage it is useful to observe thatEU andE are unchanged if there
is a variation in the coverage, constant among states, compensated by an
equivalent variation in the premium, i.e., dEU = dE = 0 if dt0 = dk = dP ,
with m unchanged. Hence, the optimal coverage schedule is dened up to
an additive constant. Without loss of generality, we may assume that no
insurance payment is made outside the verication set, i.e., t0 = 0. We
should then have t(x) = x   k > 0 if x > m, or equivalently m   k  0. In
such a case, the policyholder les a claim only if the loss level exceeds the
threshold m. This threshold may be viewed as a deductible.
Note that the optimal coverage is no more indeterminate if we assume,
more realistically, that the cost c is the sum of the audit cost and of an
administrative cost which is incurred whenever a claim is led, be it veried
or not. In such a case, choosing t0 = 0 in the no-verication set is the only
optimal solution since it saves the administration cost see Picard (2000).
The optimal contract is derived by maximizing
EU =
Z m
0
U(W   x  P )dF (x) + [1  F (m)]U(W   P   k); (4)
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with respect to m  0; k and P , subject to
E = P  
Z x
m+
(c+ x+ k)dF (x)  0; (5)
m  k  0: (6)
Proposition 1 Under deterministic auditing, an optimal insurance contract
 = ft(:);M; Pg satises the following conditions:
M = (m;x] with m > 0;
t(x) = 0 if x  m;
t(x) = x  k if x > m;
with 0 < k < m.
The optimal contract characterized in Proposition 1 established by Gol-
lier (1987) is depicted in Figure 2. First, it states that it is optimal to choose
a positive threshold m. The intuition is as follows. When m = 0, all positive
claims are veried and it is optimal to o¤er full coverage, i.e., t(x) = x for all
x > 0. Starting from such a full insurance contract an increase dm > 0 en-
tails no rst-order risk-sharing e¤ect. However, this increase in the threshold
cuts down the expected audit cost, which is benecial to the policyholder.
In other words, in the neighbourhood of m = 0 the trade-o¤ between cost
minimization and risk-sharing always tips in favor of the rst objective.
Secondly, we have 0 < k < m which means that partial coverage is
provided when x > m. Intuitively, the coverage schedule is chosen so as to
equalize the marginal utility of nal wealth in each state of the verication
set with the expected marginal utility of nal wealth, because any increase in
the insurance payment has to be compensated by an increase in the premium
paid whatever the level of the loss. We know that no claim is led when
x < m, which implies that the expected marginal utility of nal wealth
is larger than the marginal utility in the no-loss state. Concavity of the
policyholders utility function then implies that a partial coverage is optimal
when the threshold is crossed.
Figure 2
Thus far we have assumed that the insurer has no information at all
about the loss incurred by the policyholder. In particular, the insurer could
not observe whether a loss occurred (x > 0) or not (x = 0). Following
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Bond and Crocker (1997), we may alternately assume that the fact that the
policyholder has su¤ered some loss is publicly observable. The size of the loss
remains private information to the policyholder: verifying the magnitude of
the loss costs c to the insurer.
This apparently innocuous change in the information structure strongly
modies the shape of the optimal coverage schedule. The insurer now pays
a specic transfer t = t1 when x = 0, which occurs with probability f(0).
Lemmas 1 and 2 are unchanged and we now have
EU = f(0)U(W   P + t1) +
Z m
0+
U(W   x  P + t0)dF (x) + [1  F (m)]U(W   P   k);
E = P   t1f(0)  t0[F (m)  f(0)] 
Z x
m+
(c+ x  k)dF (x):
The optimal contract maximizesEU with respect to P;m  0; t0  0; t1 
0 and k  t0  m subject to E  0. We may choose t1 = 0, since P; t0; t1
and k are determined up to an additive constant: no insurance payment is
made if no loss occurs.
Proposition 2 Under deterministic auditing, when the fact that the poli-
cyholder has su¤ered some loss is publicly observable, an optimal insurance
contract  = ft(:);M; Pg satises the following conditions:
M = (m;x] with m > 0;
t(0) = 0;
t(x) = t0 if 0 < x  m;
t(x) = x if x > m;
with 0 < t0 < m.
Proposition 2 is established by Bond and Crocker (1997). It is depicted
in Figure 3. When an accident occurs but the claim is not veried (i.e.,
0 < x  m), the incentive compability requires the insurance payment to
be constant: we then have t(x) = t0. The payment should be larger than
t0 when the claim is veried (i.e., when x > m). Optimal risk sharing
implies that the policyholders expected marginal utility (conditional on the
information of the insurer) should be equal to the marginal utility in the
no-accident state. This implies rst that, in the no-verication region, an
optimal insurance contract entails overpayment of small claims (when 0 <
x  t0) and underpayment of large claims (when t0 < x  m). Secondly,
there is full insurance in the verication region (i.e., when x > m).
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Figure 3
Neither Figure 2 nor Figure 3 looks like the coverage schedules that are
most frequently o¤ered by insurer for two reasons: rst because of the upward
discontinuity at x = m and secondly because of overpayment of smaller
claims in the case of Figure 3. In fact, such contracts would incite the
policyholder to inate the size of his claim by intentionally increasing the
damage. Consider for example the contract described in Proposition 1 and
illustrated by Figure 2. A policyholder who su¤ers a loss x less than m but
greater than m0 would prot by increasing the damage up to x = m, insofar
as the insurer is not able to distinguish the initial damage and the extra
damage.6 In such a case, the contract dened in Proposition 1 is dominated
by a contract with a straight deductible, i.e., t(x) = Supf0; x m0g withM =
(m0; x]. As shown by Hubermann et al. (1983) and Picard (2000), in di¤erent
settings, a straight deductible is indeed optimal under such circumstances.
We thus have:
Proposition 3 Under deterministic auditing, when the policyholders can in-
ate their claims by intentionally increasing the damage, the optimal insur-
ance contract  = ft(:);M; Pg is a straight deductible
t(x) = Supf0; x mg;
with m > 0 and M = (m;x].
Proposition 3 explains why insurance policies with straight deductibles
are so frequently o¤ered by insurers, in addition to the wellknown interpre-
tations in terms of transaction costs (Arrow, 1971) or moral hazard (Holm-
ström, 1979).
3 Costly state verication: deterministic au-
diting with manipulation of audit costs
In the previous section, the policyholder was described as a purely passive
agent. His only choices were whether he les a claim or not and, should
6In fact, the policyholder would never increase the damage if and only if t(x)   x
were non-increasing over [0; x]. Given that t(x) is non-decreasing (see Lemma 2), this no-
manipulability condition implies that t(x) should be continuous. Note that extra damages
made either deliberately by the policyholder (arson is a good example) or thanks to a
middleman, such as a car repairer or a health case provider. In such cases, gathering
veriable information about intentional overpayment may be too time consuming to the
insurer. See Bourgeon and Picard (1999) on corporate re insurance when there is a risk
of arson.
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the occasion arise, what is the size of the claim? As a matter of fact, in
many cases, the policyholder involved in an insurance fraud case plays a
much more active part. In particular, he may try to falsify the damages in
the hope of receiving a larger insurance payment. Usually, falsication goes
through collusion with agents, such as healthcare providers, car repairers or
attorneys, who are in position to make it more di¢ cult or even impossible
to prove that the claim has been built up or deliberately created.7 Even if
fraudulent claiming may be detered at equilibrium, the very possibility for
policyholders to falsify claims should be taken into account in the analysis
of optimal insurance contracts.
Two main approaches to claims falsication have been developed in the
literature. Firstly, Bond and Crocker (1997) and Picard (2000) assume that
the policyholder may manipulate audit costs, which means that they ex-
pend resources to make the verication of claims more costly or more time
consuming to the auditor. In this approach, detering the policyholder from
manipulating audit cost is feasible and, sometimes, optimal. What is most
important is the fact that the coverage schedule a¤ects the incentives of pol-
icyholders to manipulate audit costs, which gives a specic moral hazard
dimension to the problem of designing an optimal insurance contract. In an-
other approach, developed by Crocker and Morgan (1997), it is assumed that
policyholders may expend resources to falsify the actual magnitude of their
losses in an environment where verication of claims is not possible. Here
also the coverage schedule a¤ects the incentives to claims falsication, but
the cost of generating insurance claims through falsication di¤ers among
policyholders according to their true level of loss. These di¤erential costs
make it possible to implement loss-contingent insurance payments with some
degree of claims falsication at equilibrium.
In this section and the following, we review both approaches in turn. For
the sake of expositional clarity, we refer to them as costly state verication
with manipulation of audit cost and costly state falsication, although in
both cases the policyholder falsies his claim, i.e., he prevents the insurer
observing the true level of damages. In the rst approach, the policyholder
deters the auditor from performing an informative audit while in the second
7On collusion between physicians and workers, see the analysis of workerscompensa-
tions by Dionne and St-Michel (1991) and Dionne et al.(1995). See Derrig et al. (1994)
on empirical evidence about the e¤ect of the presence of an attorney on the probability
of reaching the monetary threshold that restricts the eligibility to le a tort claim in the
Massachusetts no-fault automobile insurance system. In the Tort system, Cummins and
Tennyson (1992) describe the costs to motorists experiencing minor accidents of colluding
with lawyers and physicians as the price of a lottery ticket. The lottery winnings are the
motorists share of a general damage award.
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one he provides a distorted image of his damages.
The audit cost manipulation hypothesis has been put forward by Bond
and Crocker (1997) in the framework of a model with deterministic auditing.
They assume that policyholders may take actions (refered to as evasion costs)
that a¤ect the audit cost. Specically, Bond and Crocker assume that, after
observing their loss x, a policyholder may incur expenditures e 2 fe0; e1g,
with e1 > e0, which randomly a¤ects the audit cost. If e = ei, then the audit
cost is c = cH with probability pi and c = cL with probability 1   pi, with
i 2 f0; 1g; cH > cL and p1 > p0. In other words, a large level of manipulation
expenditures makes it more likely that the audit cost will be large. Without
loss of generality, assume e0 = 0. Let us also simplify by assuming cL = 0.
These expenditures are in terms of utility so that the policyholders utility
function is now U(Wf )  e.
Bond and Crocker assume that the actual audit cost is veriable, so
that the insurance contract may be conditionned on c. Under determinis-
tic auditing, an insurance contract  is then dened by a premium P , a
state-contingent coverage schedule ti(x) and a state-contingent verication
set M i = (mi; x], where i = H if c = cH and i = L if c = cL. Bond and
Crocker also assume that the insurer can observe whether an accident has oc-
cured, but not the size of the actual damages and (without loss of generality),
they assume that no insurance payment is made if x = 0.
An optimal no-manipulation insurance contract maximizes the expected
utility of the policyholder subject to:
 The insurers participation constraint
 Incentive compatibility constraints that may be written as
ti(x) =

ti0 if x 2 (0;mi]
> ti0 if x 2 (mi; x]
for i = H or L.
 The constraint that the policyholder does not engage in audit cost
manipulation whatever his loss, i.e.,
p1U(W   x  P + tH(x)) + (1  p1)U(W   x  P + tL(x))  e1
 p0U(W   x  P + tH(x)) + (1  p0)U(W   x  P + tL(x))
for all x in (0; x].
Bond and Crocker (1997) show the following proposition.
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Proposition 4 The optimal no-manipulation insurance contract  = ftH(:); tL(:);mH ;mL; Pg
has the following properties:
(i) mH < x and mL = 0
(ii) tH(x) = x for x > mH and tH(x) = tH0 for 0 < x  mH
(iii) tL(x) = x for ex  x  x and tL(x) = S(x) for 0 < x < ex where S(x)
is given by
(p1   p0)[U(W   x  P + tH0 )  U(W   x  P + S(x)]  e1 = 0:
The optimal no-manipulation contract is depicted in Figure 4. If there
were no possibility of audit cost manipulation, then the optimal insurance
contract would involve mL = 0 and tL(x) = x for all x (since cL = 0) and
mH > 0; tH(x) = x if x > m and 0 < tH0 < mH (see Proposition 2). This sug-
gests that manipulating audit cost (i.e., choosing e = e1) may be a protable
strategy for low values of x. Proposition 4 shows that overcompensating
easily veried losses is an appropriate strategy to mitigate the policyholders
incentive to engage in audit cost manipulation. This overcompensation is
dened by the S(x) function. S(x) denotes the minimum payo¤ in the cL
state that makes the policyholder indi¤erent between manipulating or not
and ex is the threshold under which the policyholder chooses to evade if he is
o¤ered the full insurance contract in the cL state.
Since overcompensating is costly to the insurer, it may be optimal to allow
for some degree of manipulation at equilibrium. Bond and Crocker provide
a characterization of this optimal contract with audit cost manipulation at
equilibrium. In particular, they show that there is still a subintervall [s2; s1]
in (0;mH) where the insurer overcompensates the loss in the cL state, with
tL(x) = S(x) > x when s2  x < s1. Finally they show that, when U exhibits
constant absolute risk aversion, then the optimal contract in the presence of
audit cost manipulation results in lower payo¤s and less monitoring in the
cH state than would an optimal contract in an environment where claims
manipulation was not possible.8
Figure 4
The analysis of Bond and Crocker (1997) is interesting rstly because it is
a rst step toward a better understanding of the active part that policyholders
may take in insurance fraud. Furthermore, it provides a rationale for the fact
8The CARA assumption eliminates wealth e¤ects from incentives constraints.
12
that insurers may be willing to settle small claims generously and without
question when the loss is easily monitored to forestall a claim that may be
larger and more di¢ cult to verify. From a normative point of view, the Bond-
Crocker analysis suggests that the appropriate way to mitigate build-up is
not to increase the amount of monitoring but to design coverage schedules
in such a way that policyholders have less incentive to engage in fraudulent
claiming.
Two other aspects of the Bond-Crocker model have to be emphasized.
First, the optimal coverage schedule is such that small claims are overcom-
pensated whatever the audit cost, which may incite the policyholder to in-
tentionally bring about damages. This issue has already been addressed in
Section 3 and we will not hark back to it any further. Secondly, Bond and
Crocker assume that the actual audit cost is veriable so that the insurance
coverage may be conditioned on it. This is a very strong assumption. In most
cases, claims verication is performed by an agent (an expert, a consulting
physician, an attorney, an investigator...) who may have private information
about the cost entailed by a specic claim. Picard (2000) focuses attention
on the agency relationship that links the insurer and the auditor when pol-
icyholders may manipulate audit costs and the insurer does not observe the
cost incurred by the auditor. His analysis may be summarized as follows.
The auditor sends a report ex 2 [0; x] which is an evaluation of the mag-
nitude of the loss. Let ex = ; when no audit is performed. Observing the
magnitude of the loss costs ca to the auditor. The policyholder may incur
a manipulation cost e and, in such a case, the cost of elicitating veriable
information about the size of the damages become ca+be, where the parame-
ter b > 0 characterizes the manipulation technology. Furthermore, veriable
information is necessary to prove that the claim has been build up (i.e., to
prove that x < bx). The insurer does not observe the audit cost. He o¤ers an
incentive contract to his auditor to motivate him to gather veriable infor-
mation about fraudulent claims. Let t and r be respectively the insurance
payment and the auditors fees. Contracts T (:) and R(:) specify t and r as
functions of the auditors report.9 We have t = T (ex) and r = R(ex) where
T (:) : [0; x] [ ; ! R+ and T (:) : [0; x] [ ; ! R.
The auditor-policyholder relationship is described as a three stage audit
game. At stage 0, a loss x, randomly drawn in [0; x], is privately observed
by the policyholder.10 At stage 1, the policyholder reports a claim bx 2 [0; x]
9The payment R(:) is net of standard audit cost ca.
10Contrary to the Bond-Crocker (1997) model, it is assumed that the insurer cannot
observe whether an accident has occured, i.e., he cannot distinguish the event fx = 0g
from fx > 0g. Furthermore, the manipulation cost e is in monetary terms and not utility
terms as in Bond-Crocker (1997).
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and he incurs the manipulation cost e  0. At stage 2, the claim is audited
whenever bx 2 M = (m;x]. When bx 2 M , the auditor observes x and he
reports ex 2 fx; bxg to the insurer. If ex = x 6= bx, the auditor incurs the cost
ca + be so that his report incorporates veriable information. If ex = bx, the
auditors cost is only ca. The payments to the policyholder and to the auditor
are respectively T (ex) and R(ex).
In this setting, an allocation is described by  = ft(:);M; Pg, with M =
(m;x] and by !(:) : [0; x]! R, where !(x) is the auditors equilibrium payo¤
(net of audit cost) when the loss is equal to x.
Contracts fT (:); R(:)g are said to implement the allocation f; !(:)g if at
a perfect equilibrium of the audit game, there is no audit cost manipulation
(i.e., e = 0 for all x), the claim is veried if and only if x 2 M and the net
payo¤s dened by T (:) and R(:) are equal to t(x); !(x) when the loss is
equal to x.11
In such a setting, the equilibrium audit cost is !(x) + ca if x 2 M and
!(x) if x 2 M c. Furthermore, the auditors participation constraint may be
written as Z x
0
V (!(x))dF (x)  ; (7)
where V (:) is the auditors von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, with
V 0 > 0; V 00  0 and  is an exogenous reservation utility level.
The optimal allocation f; !(:)g maximizes the policyholders expected
utility, subject to the insurers and the auditors participation constraints
and to the constraint that there exist contracts fT (:); R(:)g that implement
f; !(:)g.
Picard (2000) characterizes the optimal allocation in a setting where the
policyholder can inate their claim by intentionally increasing the damages,
which implies that t(x) x should be nonincreasing (see Section 2). His main
result is the following:
Proposition 5 When the auditor is risk averse (V 00 < 0), the optimal in-
surance contract is a deductible with coinsurance for high levels of damages:
t(x) = 0 if 0  x  m;
t(x) = x m if m  x  x0;
t0(x) 2 (0; 1) if x0  x  x;
with 0  m < x0  x and M = (m;x].
11Picard (2000) shows that allowing for audit cost manipulation (i.e., e > 0) at equilib-
rium is a weakly dominated strategy for the insurer.
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Furthermore, the auditors fees (expressed as function of the size of the
claim) are
r = r1   bt(x) ifx > m;
r = r0 if x  m;
where r0 and r1 are constant.
Picard (2000) also gives su¢ cient conditions for m > 0 and x0 < x. The
contracts characterized in Proposition 5 are depicted in Figure 5. We have
t(x) = 0 when x is in the no-verication set [0;m]. Hence, the threshold
m may be interpreted as a deductible under which no claim is led. In
the verication set, there is coinsurance of large losses (i.e., the slope of the
coverage schedule is less than one when x > x0). Furthermore, the insurer
should pay contingent fees to his auditor: the auditors fees are (linearly)
decreasing in the insurance indemnity payment.
Figure 5
The intuition for these results are as follows. Let x 2M . A deviation from
truthful revelation of loss without audit cost manipulation (i.e., bx = x; e = 0)
to bx = x0 > x; e > 0 is protable to the policyholder if T (x0)   e > T (x)
provided the claim is accepted by the auditor, which implies R(x0)  R(x) 
be. Both conditions are incompatible (for all e) if
R(x0) + bT (x0)  R(x) + bT (x)
For all x 2 M , we have t(x) = T (x); !(x) = R(x). This means that
!(x) + bt(x) should be nonincreasing for manipulation of audit cost to be
detered. In other words, a 1 $ increase in the indemnity payment should
lead at least to a b $ decrease in the auditors fees. Because the auditor is
risk averse, it would be suboptimal to have !0(x) <  bt0(x), which gives the
result on contingent fees. Because of condition !0(x) =  bt0(x), a greater
scope of variation in insurance payments entails a greater variability in the
auditors fees and thus a larger risk premium paid to the auditor for his
participation constraint to be satised. Some degree of coinsurance for large
losses then allows the insurer to decrease the auditors expected fees which
is ultimately benecial to the policyholder. This argument does not hold if
the auditor is risk-neutral and, in that case, a straight deductible is optimal.
Inversely, a ceiling on coverage is optimal when the auditor is innitely risk-
averse or when he is a¤ected by a limited liability constraint.
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4 Costly state falsication
Let us come now to the analysis of state falsication rst examined by Lacker
and Weinberg (1989)12 and applied to an insurance setting by Crocker and
Morgan (1997).13, The policyholders are in position to misrepresent their
actual losses by engaging in costly falsication activities. The outcome of
these activities is a claim denoted by y 2 R+. The insurer only observes y:
contrary to the costly state verication setting, verifying the actual magni-
tude of damages is supposed to be prohibively costly. Hence, an insurance
contract only species a coverage schedule t = T (y). Claims falsication is
costly to the policyholder, particularly because it may require colluding with
a provider (an automechanics, a physician...) or using the services of an at-
torney. Let C(x; y) be the falsication cost. The policyholders nal wealth
becomes
Wf = W   x  P + T (y)  C(y; x):
Let y(x) be the (potentially falsied) claim of a policyholder who suf-
fers an actual loss x. Given a falsication strategy y(:) : [0; x] ! R+, the
policyholders nal wealth may be written as a function of his loss:
Wf (x)  W   x  P + T (y(x))  C(y(x); x) (8)
An optimal insurance contract maximizes EU(Wf (x)) with respect to
T (:) and P subject to
P 
Z x
0
T (y(x))dF (x); (9)
y(x) 2 Arg Maxy0T (y0)  C(y0; x) for all x 2 [0; x]: (10)
(9) is the insurers participation constraint and (10) species that y(x) is an
optimal falsication strategy of a type-x policyholder.
Since the payments fP; T (:)g are dened up to an additive constant, we
may assume T (0) = 0 without loss of generality. For the time being, let
us restrict attention to linear coverage schedule, i.e., T (y) = y + . Our
normalization rule gives  = 0. Assume also that the falsication costs borne
by the policyholder depend upon the absolute amount of misrepresentation
(y   x) and, for the sake of simplicity, assume C = (y   x)2=2, where  is
an exogenous cost parameter. (10) then gives
y(x)  x+ 

: (11)
12See also Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995).
13Hau (2008) analyzes costly state verication and costly state falsication in a unied
model. See Crocker and Tennyson (1999),(2002) and Dionne and Gagné (2001) on econo-
metric testing of the theoretical predictions of models involving costly state falsication.
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Hence the amount of falsication y(x)   x is increasing in the slope of the
coverage schedule and decreasing in the falsication cost parameter. The
optimal coverage schedule will tradeo¤ two conicting objectives: providing
more insurance to the policyholder, which requires increasing , and miti-
gating the incentives to claim falsication by lowering .
The insurers participation constraint (9) is binding at the optimum,
which gives
P =
Z x
0

x+
2


dF (x) = Ex+
2

:
(8) then gives
Wf (x) =W   (1  )x  Ex+ 
2
2
Maximizing EU(Wf (x)) with respect to  leads to the following rst-
order condition
@EU
@
= E

x  Ex  


U 0(Wf (x))

= 0; (12)
and thus
@EU
@
j=1=  1

U 0

W   Ex  1
2

< 0; (13)
@EU
@
j=0= Ef(x  Ex)U 0(W   x)g > 0: (14)
We also have
@2EU
@2
=  1

EU 0(Wf (x)) + E
(
x  Ex  

2
U 00(Wf (x))
)
< 0; (15)
which implies that 0 <  < 1 at the optimum. Hence, under costly state
falsication, the optimal linear coverage schedule entails some degree of coin-
surance and (11) shows that there exists a certain amount of claims falsica-
tion at equilibrium. This characterization results from the trade-o¤ between
the above mentioned coniting objectives: providing insurance to the policy-
holder and detering him from engaging in costly claim falsication activities.
This trade-o¤ is particularly obvious when U(:) is quadratic. In that case,
we may write
EU(Wf ) = EWf   V ar(Wf ) with  > 0 (16)
and straightforward calculations give
 =
22
1 + 22
(17)
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at the optimum, where 2  V ar(x).
Hence, the coinsurance coe¢ cient  is an increasing function of the cost
parameter , of the risk aversion index  and of the variance of the loss. We
have
T (y(x)) = x+
2

;
which give T (y(x)) > x if x < x0 and T (y(x)) < x if x > x0 with x0 =
2=(1  ). Hence in this case, the optimal indemnication rule overcom-
pensates small losses and it overpays larger ones. This is depicted in Figure
6.
Assume now that the insurer observes whether a loss occured or not, as
in the paper by Crocker and Morgan (1997). Then an insurance contract is
dened by a premium P , an insurance payment t0 if x = 0 and an insurance
coverage schedule T (y) to be enforced if x > 0. In that case, a natural
normalization rule is t0 = 0. We still assume that T (y) is linear: T (y) =
y + . For the sake of simplicity, we also assume that U(:) is quadratic.
Figure 6
The insurers participation constraint and (11) give
P = Ex+ [1  f(0)]

2

+ 

; (18)
which implies
Wf = W   Ex  [1  f(0)]

2

+ 

if x = 0;
Wf = W   Ex  [1  f(0)]

2

+ 

  (1  )x+  + 
2
2
if x > 0;
and we obtain
EWf = W   Ex  
2
2
[1  f(0)]; (19)
and
V ar(Wf ) = f(0)[1 f(0)]

 +
2
2
2
+(1 )22 2f(0)(1 )

 +
2
2

Ex:
(20)
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Maximizing EU(Wf ) dened by (16) with respect to  and  gives the
following result
 =
2e2
1 + 2e2 ; (21)
 = (1  )x  
2
2
; (22)
where e2 = V ar(x j x > 0) and x = E(x j x > 0) i.e., e2 and x are
respectively the variance and the expected value of the magnitude of damages
conditional on a loss occuring.
(21) is similar to (17) and it may be interpreted in the same way. The
fact that  is strictly positive (and less than one) means that some degree of
insurance is provided but also that there is claims falsication at equilibrium.
 may be positive or negative, but the insurance payment T (y(x)) is always
positive.14 As in the previous case, small losses are overcompensated and
there is undercompensation for more severe losses.
Crocker and Morgan (1997) obtain a similar characterization without
restricting themselves to a linear-quadratic model. They characterize the
allocations, ft(:); y(:); Pg, with t(:) : [0; x]! R+ and y(:) : (0; x]! R+, that
may be implemented by a coverage schedule T (y).15 For such an allocation,
there exists T (:) : R+ ! R+ such that
y(x) 2 Arg maxy0 fT (y0)  C(y0; x)g;
and
t(x) = T (y(x)) for all x:
The Revelation Principle (Myerson, 1979) applies in such a context, which
means that implementable allocations may be obtained as the outcome of a
revelation game in which
1. The insurance payment t and the action y are dened as functions of
a message ex 2 [0; x] of the policyholder, i.e., t = t(ex); y = y(ex).
2. Truthtelling is an optimal strategy for the policyholder, i.e.,
x 2 Arg Maxexft(ex  C(y(ex); x)g (23)
14When  is negative, the optimal coverage schedule is equivalent to a deductible m =
 = with a coinsurance provision for larger losses, i.e., T (y(x)) = Supf0; (y  m)g.
15Crocker and Morgan assume that the insurer can observe whether a loss occurred or
not. Hence, there may be falsication only if x > 0.
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for all x in (0; x].
Such an allocation ft(:); y(:)g is said to be incentive compatible. The opti-
mal allocation maximizes the policyholders expected utilityEU(Wf (x)) with
respect to t(:); y(:) and P subject to the insurers participation constraint
and to incentive compatibility constraints. Using a standard technique of
incentives theory, Crocker and Morgan characterize the optimal solution of a
less-constrained problem in which a rst-order truthtelling condition is sub-
stituted to (23). They obtain the following result.16,17
Proposition 6 The optimal solution to the insurance problem under claims
falsication satises
y(0+) = 0; y(x) = x and y(x) > x if 0 < x < x;
t0(0+) = t0(x) = 0 and t0(x) > 0 if 0 < x < x;
t(0+) > 0 and t(x) < x:
Proposition 6 extends the results already obtained in this section to a
more general setting, with a non linear coverage schedule. The optimal solu-
tion always entails some degree of falsication except at the top (when x = x)
and at the bottom (when x ! 0+). The insurance payment is increasing in
the magnitude of the actual damages and it provides overinsurance (respect.
underinsurance) for small (respect. large) losses.
5 Costly state verication: the case of ran-
dom auditing
We now come back to the costly state verication setting. Under random
auditing, the insurer veries the claims with a probability that depends upon
the magnitude of damages. The insurance payment may di¤er depending
on whether the claim has been veried or not. A policyholder who su¤ers a
loss x les a claim bx that will be audited with probability p(bx). If there is
an audit, the true damages are observed by the insurer and the policyholder
16There are some minor di¤erences between the Crocker-Morgans setting and ours.
They are not mentioned for the sake of brevity
17The second-order condition for incentive compability requires y(x) to be monotonically
increasing. If the solution to the less constrained problem satises this monotonicity
condition, then the optimal allocation is characterized as in Proposition 6. See Crocker
and Morgan (1997) for a numerical example. If this is not the case, then the optimal
allocation entails bunching on (at least) an interval (x0; x00)  [0; x], i.e., y(x) = by; t(x) = bt
for all x in (x0; x00). In such a case, the coverage schedule T (y) that sustains the optimal
allocation is not di¤erentiable at y = by.
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receives an insurance payment tA(x; bx). If there is no audit, the insurance
payment is denoted tN(bx).
When a policyholder with damages x les a claim bx, is expected utility is
[1  p(bx)]U(W   P   x+ tN(bx)) + p(bx)U(W   P   x+ tA(x; bx)):
The Revelation Principle applies to this setting and we can restrict attention
to incentive compatible insurance contracts, that is to contracts where the
policyholder is given incentives to report his loss truthfully. Such incentive
compatible contracts are such that
[1  p(x)]U(W   P   x+ tN(x)) + p(x)U(W   P   x+ tA(x; x))
 [1  p(bx)]U(W   P   x+ tN(bx)) + p(bx)U(W   P   x+ tA(x; bx));(24)
for all x; bx 6= x.
Let us assume that the net payment from the policyholder to the insurer
P   tA(x; bx) is bounded by a maximal penalty that can be imposed in case
of misrepresentation of damages (i.e., when x 6= bx). This maximal penalty18
may depend on the true level of damages x and will be denoted B(x). Hence,
we have
P   tA(x; bx)  B(x) if x 6= bx: (25)
For instance, Mookherjee and Png (1989) assume that the wealth of the poli-
cyholder is prefectly liquid and that his nal wealth can be at most set equal
to zero in case of false claim detected by audit. We have B(x)  W   x in
that case. Fagart and Picard (1999) assume that the policyholder is a¤ected
by a liquidity constraint and that the liquid assets of the policyholder have
a given value B. The maximal penalty is then B(x) = B for all x. Another
interpretation of (25) is that B(x)  B is an exogenously given parameter
that represents the cost (in monetary terms) incurred by a policyholder who
is prosecuted after he led a fraudulent claim detected by audit.19
18The Revelation Principle does not apply any more if the maximal penalty also depend
on the claim bx. In such a case, there may be false report at equilibrium.
19Under this interpretation, it may be more natural to assume that the policyholder
should pay the penalty B in addition to the premium P , since the latter is usually paid
at the beginning of the time period during which the insurance policy is enforced. In fact,
both assumptions are equivalent when the policyholder is a¤ected by a liquidity constraint.
Indeed, in such a case, it would be optimal to x the insurance premium P at the largest
possible level (say P = P ) and to compensate adequately the policyholder by providing
large insurance payments tN and tA unless a fraudulent claim is detected by audit. This
strategy provides the highest penalty in case of fraud, without a¤ecting equilibrium net
payments tN   P and tA   P . If the law of insurance contracts species a penalty bB to
be paid in case of fraudulent claim, we have P   tA(x; bx)  P + bB which corresponds to
(25) with B(x)  P + bB.
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This upper bound on the penalty plays a crucial role in the analysis of
optimal insurance contracts under random auditing. Indeed, by increasing
the penalty, the insurer could induce truthtelling by the policyholder with
a lower probability of auditing, which, since auditing is costly, reduces the
cost of the private information. Consequently, if there were no bound on the
penalty, rst-best optimality could be approximated with very large nes and
a very low probability of auditing. Asymetry of information would not be a
problem in such a case.
In equilibrium, the policyholder always reports his loss truthfully. Hence,
it is optimal to make the penalty as large as possible since this provides
maximum incentive to tell the truth without a¤ecting the equilibrium pay-
o¤s.20 We thus have
tA(x; bx) = P  B(x) if x 6= bx
Finally, we assume that the policyholders nal wealth Wf should be
larger than a lower bound denoted A(x). This bound on the policyholders
nal wealth may simply result from a feasibility condition on consumption.
In particular, we may have Wf  0 which gives A(x) = 0 for all x. The
lower bound on nal wealth may also be logically linked to the upper bound
on the penalty: when B(x) corresponds to the value of liquid assets of the
policyholder, we have P   tN(x)  B(x) and P   tA(x; x)  B(x) for all
x which implies Wf  W   x   B(x)  A(x). Mookherjee and Png (1989)
assume B(x) = W   x, which gives A(x) = 0. Fagart and Picard (1999)
assume B(x) = B, which gives A(x) =W   x B.
Let tA(x)  tA(x; x). Under random auditing, a contract will be denoted
 = ftA(:); tN(:); p(:); Pg. An optimal contract maximizes
EU =
Z x
0
f[1 p(x)]U(W P x+tN(x))+p(x)U(W P x+tA(x))gdF (x)
(26)
with respect to P; tA(:); tN(:) and p(:) subject to the following constraints:
E = P  
Z x
0
f[1  p(x)]tN(x) + p(x)[tA(x) + c]gdF (x)  0; (27)
20In a more realistic setting, there would be several reasons for which imposing maximal
penalties on defrauders may not be optimal. In particular, audit may be imperfect so that
innocent individuals may be falsely accused. Furthermore, a policyholder may overestimate
his damages in good faith. Lastly, very large nes may create incentives for policyholders
caught cheating to bribe the auditor to overlook their violation.
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[1  p(x)]U(W   P   x+ tN(x)) + p(x)U(W   P   x+ tA(x))

[1  p(bx)]U(W   P   x+ tN(bx)) + p(bx)U(W   x B(x))
for all x; bx 6= x; (28)
W   P   x+ tN(x)  A(x) for all x; (29)
W   P   x+ tA(x)  A(x) for all x; (30)
0  p(x)  1 for all x: (31)
(27) is the insurers participation constraint. Inequalities (28) are the in-
centive compatibility constraints that require the policyholder to be willing
to report his level of loss truthfully. (29), (30) and (31) are feasibility con-
traints.21
Mookherjee and Png (1989) have established a number of properties of
an optimal contract. They are synthetized in Proposition 7 hereafter. In this
proposition (x) denotes the expected utility of the policyholder when his
loss is x, i.e.,
(x) = [1  p(x)]U(W   P   x+ tN(x)) + p(x)U(W   P   x+ tA(x)):
Proposition 7 Under random auditing, an optimal insurance contract  =
ftA(:); tN(:); p(:); Pg, has the following properties:
(i) p(x) < 1 for all x if (x) > U(W   x B(x)) for all x;
(ii) tA(x) > tN(x) for all x such that p(x) > 0;
(iii) If p(bx) > 0 for some bx then there exists x such that (x) = [1  
p(bx)]U(W   x  P + tN(bx)) + p(bx)U(W   x B(x));
(iv) If (x) > u(W x B(x)) for all x and tN(bx) =MinftN(x); x 2 [0; x]g,
then p(bx) = 0 and p(x00) > p(x0) if tN(x00) > tN(x0).
In Proposition 7, the condition (x) > U(W   x   B(x)) for all x
means that nontrivial penalties can be imposed on those detected to have
21Deterministic auditing may be considered as a particular case of random auditing
where p(x) = 1 if x 2 M and p(x) = 0 if x 2 M c, and Lemma 1 may be obtained
as a consequence of the incentive compability conditions (28). If x; bx 2 M c, (28) gives
tN (x)  tN (bx). Interverting x and bx gives tN (bx)  tN (x). We thus have tN (x) = t0 for
all x in M c. If x 2 M and x 2 M c, (28) gives tA(x)  tN (bx) = t0. If tA(x) = t0 for
x 2 [a; b]  M , then it is possible to choose p(x) = 0 if x 2 [a; b], and to decrease P ,
the other elements of the optimal contract being unchanged. The policyholders expected
utility would increase, which is a contradiction. Hence tA(x) > t0 if x 2M .
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led a fraudulent claim. Let us call it condition C. Mookherkjee and Png
(1989) assume B(x) =W   x, which means that the nal wealth can be set
equal to zero if the policyholder is detected to have lied. In such a case, C
means that the nal wealth is always positive at the optimum and a su¢ cient
condition for C to hold is U 0(0+) = +1. If we assume B(x) = B, i.e., the
penalty is upward bounded either because of a liquidity constraint or because
of statutory provisions, then C holds if B is large enough.22 If C does not
hold at equilibrium, then the optimal audit policy is deterministic and we
are back to the characterization of Section 2. In particular, the B = 0 case
reverts to deterministic auditing.
From (i) in Proposition 4, all audits must be random if C holds. The in-
tuition for this result is that under C, the policyholder would always strictly
prefer not to lie if his claim were audited with probability one. In such a
case, decreasing slightly the audit probability reduces the insurers expected
cost. This permits a decrease in the premium P , and thus an increase in
the expected utility of the policyholder, without inducing the latter to lie.
(ii) shows that the policyholder who has been veried to have reported his
damages truthfully should be rewarded. The intuition is as follows. Assume
tA(x) < tN(x) for some x. Let tA(x) respect. tN(x)be increased (respect.
decreased) slightly so that the expected cost p(x)tA(x) + [1   p(x)]tN(x) is
unchanged. This change does not disturb the incentive compatibility con-
straints and it increases the expected utility which contradicts the optimality
of the initial contract. If tA(x) = tN(x), the same variation exerts no rst-
order e¤ect on the expected utility (since we start from a full insurance
position) and it allows the insurer to reduce p(x) without disturbing any in-
centive compatibility constraint. The expected cost decreases, which enables
a decreases in the premium P and thus generates an increase in the expected
utility. This also contradicts the optimality of the initial contract. (iii) shows
that for any level of loss bx audited with positive probability, there exists a
level of loss x such that the policyholder who su¤ers the loss x is indi¤erent
between ling a truthful claim and reporting bx. In other words, when a claimbx is audited with positive probability, a decrease in the probability of audit
p(bx) would induce misreporting by the policyholder for (at least) one level of
loss x. Indeed, if this were not the case, then one could lower p(bx) without
disturbing any incentive compatibility constraint. This variation allows the
insurer to save on audit cost and it enables a decrease in the premium. The
policyholders expected utility increases which contradicts the optimality of
the initial contract. Finally, (iv) shows that, under C, the claim correspond-
ing to the lowest indemnity payment in the absence of audit should not be
22See Fagart and Picard (1999).
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audited. All other claims should be audited and the larger the indemnity
payment in the absence of audit, the larger the probability of audit. Once
again, the intuition is rather straightforward. A policyholder who les a
fraudulent claim bx may be seen as a gambler who wins the prize tN(bx) if
he has the luck not to be audited and who will pay B(x) if he gets caught.
The larger the prize, the larger the audit probability should be for fraudulent
claiming to be detered. Furthermore it is useless to verify the claims corre-
sponding to the lowest prize since it always provides a lower expected utility
than truthtelling.
The main di¢ culty if one wants to further characterize the optimal con-
tract under random auditing is to identify the incentive compatibility con-
straints that are binding at the optimum and those that are not binding. In
particular, it may be that, for some levels of damages, many (and even all)
incentive constraints are binding and, for other levels of damages none of
them are binding.23 Fagart and Picard (1999) provide a full characterization
of the optimal coverage schedule and of the audit policy when the policy-
holder has constant absolute risk aversion and the penalty is constant (i.e.,
B(x)  B).
Proposition 8 Assume U(:) exhibits constant absolute risk aversion and C
holds at the optimum. Then there exist m > 0 and k 2 (0;m) such that
tA(x) = x  k and tN(x) = x  k   (x) if x > m
tA(x) = tN(x) = 0 if x  m
with (x) > 0; 0(x) < 0; (m) = m  k; (x)! 0 when x!1.
Furthermore, we have
0 < p(x) < 1; p0(x) > 0; p00(x) < 0 when x > m
p(m) = 0
p(x) ! p 2 (0; 1) when x!1
The optimal contract characterized in Proposition 8 is depicted in Fig-
ure 7. No claim is led, when the magnitude of damages is less than m.
When the damages exceed the treshold, then the insurance payment is pos-
itive and it is larger when the claim is audited than when it is not which
conrms Proposition 7-(ii) . However the di¤erence is decreasing when the
magnitude of damages is increasing and this di¤erence goes to zero when the
23Technically, this rules out the possibility of taking up the di¤erential approach initially
developed by Guesnerie and La¤ont (1984) and widely used in the literature on incentives
contracts under adverse selection.
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damages go to innity (when x = +1). Marginal damages are fully covered
in case of audit, i.e., t0A(x) = 1 if x > m. In other words, the insurance
coverage includes a constant deductible k if the claim is veried. If the claim
is not veried, then there is also an additional deductible that disappears
when the damages become innitely large. Furthermore the probability of
audit is a concave increasing function of the damages and this probability
goes to a limit p < 1 when x goes to innity.
Figure 7
To understand the logic of these results, observe that any variation in in-
surance payment (with a compensating change in the premium) entails two
e¤ects. Firstly, it a¤ects the risk sharing between the insurer and the poli-
cyholder and, of course, this is the raison dêtre of any insurance contract.
Secondly, it may also modify the audit policy for incentive compatibility con-
straints not to be disturbed. This second e¤ect is more di¢ cult to analyze
because the e¤ects of variations in insurance payment on the incentive to tell
the truth are intricate. As above, we may describe the decision making of
the policyholder as if he were a gambler. When the true level of damages
is x, ling a fraudulent claim bx 6= x amounts to choose the lottery earning
tN(bx) with probability 1 p(bx) or loosing B with probability p(bx)in prefer-
ence to the lottery earning tN(x) with probability 1  p(x) or earning tA(x)
with probability p(x). If the incentive compability constraint corresponding
to x and bx is tight, then any increase in tN(bx) should be accompanied by
an increase in p(bx) for fraudulent claiming to be detered. However, simul-
taneously, the increase in tN(bx) may also a¤ect the optimal strategy of a
policyholder who has actually experienced a loss bx and who (for instance)
intended to le another fraudulent claim, say bx0 6= bx. This policyholder may
come back to truthfulling after the increase in tN(bx), even if tN(bx0) is slightly
increased. This sequence is possible if the preferences of our gambler over
lotteries depend upon his wealth, i.e., upon the magnitude of his loss. This
suggests that, without simplifying assumptions, analyzing the consequences
of a variation in the coverage schedule on the policyholders strategy may be
quite intricate.
The problem is much more simple under constant absolute risk aversion
since wealth e¤ects disappear from the incentive constraints when utility
is exponential. Fagart and Picard (1999) have considered this case. They
show that, when U(:) is CARA, the only incentive constraints that may be
binding at the optimum correspond to loss levels x 2 I  [0; x] for which
the policyholder receives the smallest indemnity payment. This results from
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the fact that, when U(:) is CARA, the loss x disappears from (28). We
know from Proposition 7-(ii) and (iv) that the claim is not audited in that
case, which allows us to assume tN(x) = tA(x) = 0 if x 2 I since, as before,
the optimal insurance coverage schedule ftN(:); tA(:); Pg is dened up to an
additive constant. The best risk-sharing is reached when I = [0;m], with
m > 0. Under constant absolute risk aversion, the fact that small claims
should not be audited can thus be extended to the case of random auditing.
When the loss exceeds m, it is optimal to provide a positive insurance
payment. Any increase in tN(x) should be accompanied by an increase in
p(x) for fraudulent claiming to be detered. Let (tN) be the probability of
audit for which the lottery earning tN(x) with probability 1 p(x) or loosing
B with the probability p(x)and the status quo (i.e., a zero certain gain)
are equivalent for the policyholder when his true loss level ex is in I. The
probability (tN) does not depend on ex when U(:) is CARA and we have
0 > 0, 00 < 0. The optimal audit probability is such that p(x) = (tN(x))
for all x > m.
Let c0(tN(x))dtN(x) be the additional expected audit cost induced by a
marginal increase in the insurance payment dtN(x). Adding this additional
expected audit cost to the variation in the insurance payment itself gives
the additional expected total cost [1 + c0(tN(x))]dtN(x). When a claim is
audited, the additional cost induced by an increase in the insurance pay-
ment is just dtA(x). The di¤erence in additional cost per $ paid as coverage
explains why a larger payment should be promised in case of audit i.e.,
tA(x) > tN(x) . More precisely, 00 < 0 implies that 1 + c0(tN(x)) is de-
creasing when tN(x) is increasing. Hence, the di¤erence in the additional
expected cost per $ paid as coverage decreases when tN(x) increases. This
exlains why the additional deductible tA(x)  tN(x)  (x) is decreasing and
disappears when x is large.24
6 Moral standards and adverse selection
Thus far we have assumed that the policyholders are guided only by self-
interest and that they didnt feel any morale cost after ling a fraudulent
claim. In other words, there was no intrinsic value of honesty to policyhold-
ers. In the real world, thank God, dishonesty creates morale problems and
a lot of people are detered to le fraudulent claim even if the probability of
being caught is small and the ne is moderate. However, more often than
24Let U(x) = [1   p(x)]U(W   P   x + tN (x)) + p(x)U(W   P   x + tA(x)) be the
expected utility of a policyholder who has incurred a loss x. Using p(m) = 0 shows that
U(x) is continuous at x = m.
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not, the insurers are unable to observe the morale cost incurred by their cus-
tomers which lead to an adverse selection problem.25 In such a situation, the
optimal audit policy as well as the competitive equilibrium in the insurance
market (in terms of coverage and premium) may be strongly a¤ected by the
distribution of morale costs in the population of policyholders. In particular,
the consequences of insurance fraud will be all the more severe that the pro-
portion of purely opportunistic policyholders (i.e., individuals without any
morale cost) is large.
We will approach this issue in the following setting, drawn from Picard
(1996).26 Assume that the insurance buyers face the possibility of a loss L
with probability  2 (0; 1). Hence, for the sake of simplicity, the size of the
loss is now given. The insurance contract involves a premium P and a level
of coverage t. The insurer audits claims with a probability p 2 [0; 1] at cost
c. To simplify further the analysis, we assume that the insurance payment t
is the same, whether the claim is audited or not. The reservation utility is
U = U(W L)+(1 )U(W ). The policyholders may be either opportunist,
with probability  or honest with probability 1  , with 0 <  < 1. Honest
policyholders truthfully report losses to their insurer: they would su¤er very
large morale cost when cheating. Opportunists may choose to fraudulently
report a loss. Let  be the (endogenously determined) probability for an
opportunist to le a fraudulent claim when no loss has been incurred. The
insurers cannot distinguish honest policyholders from opportunists.
Law exogenously denes the ne, denoted B, that has to be paid by a
policyholder who is detected to have lied. Let ep denote the audit probability
that makes an opportunist (who has not experienced any loss) indi¤erent
between honesty and fraud. Honesty gives Wf = W   P where W (respect.
Wf) still denotes the initial (respect. nal) wealth of the policyholder. Fraud
givesWf = W  P  B if the claim is audited andWf = W  P +t otherwise.
Hence ep is given by
U(W   P ) = epU(W   P  B) + (1  ep)U(W   P + t);
which implies
ep = U(W   P + t)  U(W   P )
U(W   P + t)  U(W   P  B)  ep(t; P ) 2 (0; 1):
Consider a contract (t; P ) chosen by a population of individuals that includes
a proportion  2 [0; 1] of opportunists. Note that  may conceivably di¤er
25This asymetric information problem may be mitigated in a repeated relationship
framework.
26See also Boyer (1999) for a similar model.
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from  if various contracts are o¤ered on the market. Given (q; P; ), the rela-
tionship between a policyholder and his insurer is described by the following
three stage game:
 At stage 1, nature determines whether the policyholder is honest or
opportunist, with probabilities 1    and  respectively. Nature also
determines whether the policyholder experiences a loss with probability
.
 At stage 2, the policyholder decides to le a claim or not. Honest
customers always tell the truth. When no loss has been incurred, op-
portunists defraud with probability .
 At stage 3, when a loss has been reported at stage 2, the insurer audits
with probability p.
Opportunists who do not experience any loss choose  to maximize
EU = [pU(W   P  B) + (1  p)U(W   P + t)] + (1  )U(W   P );
which gives
 = 0 if p > ep(t; P );
 2 [0; 1] if p = ep(t; P );
 = 1 if p < ep(t; P ):
9=; (32)
The insurer chooses p to maximize its expected prot E or equivalently
to minimize the expected cost C dened by
C = IC + AC;
with
E = P   C;
where IC and AC are respectively the expected insurance coverage and the
expected audit cost.27
Insurance coverage is paid to the policyholders who actually experience
a loss and to the opportunists who fraudulently report a loss and are not
audited. We have
IC = t[ + (1  )(1  p)] (33)
AC = pc[ + (1  )] (34)
27For the sake of simplicity, we assume that no award is paid to the insurer when an
opportunist is caught cheating. The ne B is entirely paid to the government.
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As in the previous sections, we assume that the insurer can commit to his
audit policy which means that he has a Stackelberg advantage in the audit
game: the audit probability p is chosen to minimize C given the reaction
function of opportunists. Since in the next section we want to contrast such
an equilibrium with a situation where the insurer cannot commit to its audit
policy, we refer to this commitment equilibrium with the upper index c. Let
c(t; P; ); pc(t; P; ) andCc(t; P; ) be respectively the equilibrium strategies
of opportunists and insurers and the equilibrium expected cost in an audit
game (q; P; ) under commitment to audit policy. Proposition 9 characterizes
these functions.
Proposition 9 Under commitment to audit policy, the equilibrium of an
audit game (t; P; ) is characterized by
pc(t; P; ) = 0 and c(t; P; ) = 1 if c > c0(t; P; );
pc(t; P; ) = ep(q; P ) and c(t; P; ) = 0 if c  c0(t; P; );
Cc(t; P; ) = minft[ + (1  )]; [t+ ep(t; P )c]g;
where
c0(t; P; ) =
(1  )t
ep(t; P ) :
The proof of Proposition 9 is straightforward. Only two strategies may
be optimal for the insurer: either fully preventing fraud by auditing claims
with probability p = ep(t; P ) which gives  = 028 or abstaining from any audit
(p = 0) which gives  = 1. The optimal audit strategy is chosen so as to
maximize C. Using (33) and (34) gives the result. Proposition 9 shows in
particular that, given the contract (t; P ), preventing fraud through an audit
policy is optimal if the audit cost c is low enough and the proportion of
opportunists  is large enough.
We now consider a competitive insurance market with free entry, where
insurers complete by o¤ering policies. An adverse selection feature is brought
in the model because the insurers cannot distinguish opportunists from hon-
est policyholders. Following the approach of Wilson (1977), a market equi-
librium is dened as a set of protable contracts such that no insurer can
o¤er another contract which remains protable after the other insurers have
withdrawn all non-protable contracts in reaction to the o¤er. Picard (1996)
characterizes the market equilibrium by assuming that honest individuals are
28 = 0 is an optimal strategy for opportunists when p = ep(t; P ) and it is the only
optimal strategy if p = ep(t; P ) + "; " > 0.
30
uniformly distributed among the best contracts, likewise for opportunists.
This assumption will be called A. Let29
(tc; P c) = Arg Maxt;PfU(W   L+ t  P ) + (1  )U(W   P )
s.t. P  Cc(t; P; )g:
Proposition 10 Under A; (tc; P c) is the unique market equilibrium when
the insurers can commit to their audit policy.
According to Proposition 10, a market equilibrium is dened by a unique
contract (tc; P c) that maximizes the expected utility of honest policyholders
under the constraint that opportunists cannot be set aside.30 The arguments
at work in the proof of Proposition 10 can be summarized as follows. Let
us rst note that all contracts o¤ered at equilibrium are necessarily equiva-
lent for honest customers, otherwise some equilibrium contracts would only
attract opportunists. Given A, this would imply that  = 1 is the equi-
librium strategy of opportunists for such contract and these contracts could
not be protable. Equilibrium contracts are also equivalent for opportunists.
Assume a contrario that opportunists concentrate on a subset of equilib-
rium contracts. For these contracts, the proportion of opportunists is larger
than  and honest individuals prefer (tc; P c) to these contracts. A contract
(tc   "; P c); " > 0 would attract all honest individuals for " small and would
remain protable even if opportunists nally also opt for this new contract.
This contradicts the denition of a market equilibrium. Hence, for any con-
tract (t; P ) o¤ered at the equilibrium, the insurersparticipation constraint is
P  Cc(t; P; ). If (tc; P c) is not o¤ered, then another contract could be pro-
posed that would be strictly preferred by honest individuals and that would
remain protable whatever the reaction of opportunists. Hence (tc; P c) is the
only possible market equilibrium. Another contract (et; eP ), o¤ered in addi-
tion to (tc; P c) will be protable if it attracts honest individuals only31 and
if eP > et. If (et; eP ) were o¤ered, the insurers that go on o¤ering (tc; P c) loose
money. Indeed in such a case we necessarily have c(tc; P c; e) = 1 where e is
the proportion of opportunists in the population of insureds who still choose
(tc; P c) after (et; eP ) has been o¤ered with e > .32
29We assume that (tc; P c) is a singleton
30Proposition 10 shows that a pooling contract is o¤ered at equilibrium: there does not
exist any separating equilibrium where honest and opportunist individuals would choose
di¤erent contracts. This result is also obtain by Boyer (1999) in a similar framework.
31Opportunists cannot benet from separating and (tc; P c) is the best pooling contract
for honest individuals.
32We have e = 1 if all honest policyholders choose (et; eP ) and e = 2+1 if (et; eP ) and
(tc; P c) are equivalent for honest policyholders.
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We then have
Cc(tc; P c; c) = tc[ + e(1  )]
> tc[ + (1  )]  Cc(tc; P c; ) = P c;
which proves that (tc; P c) becomes non-protable. Hence (tc; P c) will be
withdrawn and all individuals will turn toward the new contract (et; eP ). This
new contract will show a decit and it will not be o¤ered, which establishes
that (tc; P c) is the market equilibrium.
The market equilibrium is depicted in Figures 8 and 9. The perfect infor-
mation market equilibrium is A with full insurance o¤ered at fair premium.
Maximizing EU = U(W   L  P + t) + (1  )U(W   P ) with respect
to t  0; P  0 subject to P = [t+ cep(t; P )] gives t = bt and P = bP at point
B. We denote B the expected utility at B and we assume B > U , i.e., the
origin of the axis is over the indi¤erence curve that goes through B. This
assumption is satised if the audit cost c is not too large. Maximizing EU
with respect to t  0; P  0 subject to P = t[ + (1   )] gives t = t and
P = P at point C. We denote C()the expected utility at C, with 
0
C() < 0.
Let b 2 (0; 1) such that B = C(b). When  > b, the market equilibrium is
at B: the insurers audit claims with probability ep(bt; bP ) and the opportunists
are detered from defrauding. When  < b, the market equilibrium is at C:
the insurers do not audit claims because the proportion of opportunists is too
small for verifying claims to be protable and the opportunists systematically
defraud. Hence, when  < b, there is fraud at equilibrium.
Figure 8
Figure 9
Here, we have assumed that the proportion of opportunistic individuals
in the population is exogenously given. Note however that moral standards
may be a¤ected by the perception of insurershonesty and also by beliefs
about the prevalence of fraud among policyholders.33 It has been widely
documented in the business ethics literature that insurance defrauders often
do not perceive insurance claim padding as an unethical behavior and even
tend to practice some kind of self-justication. In particular, a common view
33Poverty may also a¤ect morality. In particular, moral standards may decrease when
the economic situation worsens. Dionne and Wang (2011) analyze the empirical relation-
ship between opportunistic fraud and the business cycle in the Taiwan automobile theft
insurance market. They show that fraud is stimulated during periods of recession and
mitigated during periods of expansion.
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among consumers holds that insurance fraud would just be the rational re-
sponse to the unfair behavior of insurance companies. Tennyson (1997,2002)
emphasizes that the psychological attitude toward insurance fraud is related
to the perception of the fairness of insurance rms by policyholders. She
shows that negative perceptions of insurance institutions are related to atti-
tudes toward ling exaggerated claims. For instance, Tennyson (2002) shows
that consumers who are not condent of the nancial stability of their in-
surer and those who nd auto insurance premiums to be burdensomely high
are more likely than others to nd fraud acceptable.Thus, consumers would
tend to rationalize and justify their fraudulent claims through their negative
perceptions of insurance companies.34
Fukukawa et al. (2007) substantiate this approach of the psychology of
insurance defrauders.35 They use a questionnaire to examine the factors that
inuence the decision-making of "aberrant consumer behaviors" (ACB) such
as exagerating an insurance claim, but also changing a price tag, returning
a stained suit, copying software from a friend and taking a quality towel
from an hotel. Four factors emerged from a Principle Component Analysis,
with among them the perception of unfairness relating to business practice36.
Fukukawa et al. (2007) show that the perceived unfairness factor is dominant
in characterizing the occurence of the scenario where individuals exaggerate
claims and that its e¤ect on insurance fraud is signicantly larger than on the
other aberrant behavior scenarios.37 Likewise, individualsmoral standards
may depend on their perception of ethics heterogeneity : a policyholder may
choose to be honest if he thinks this is the standard behavior in the society
around him, but he may start cheating if he thinks "everybody does it".
Such perceptions of social ethical standards would a¤ect the proportion  of
opportunistic policyholders.
34See also Dean (2004) on the perception of the ethicality of insurance claim fraud.
35See also Strutton et al. (1994) on how consumers may justify inappropriate behavior
in market settings.
36The Perceived Unfairness factor is comprised of items related to the perception of
unfair business practice, for instance because the insurer is overcharging, or because ACB
is nothing but retaliation against some inadequate practice or because of weak business
performance. Other factors are labeled Evaluation (loading variables relating to the eas-
iness to engage in ACB or to the general attitude toward ACB), Social Participation
(with variables representing the social external encouragement to ACB) and Consequence
(measuring the extent to which the outcomes of ACB are seen as benecial or harmful).
37See Bourgeon and Picard (2012) for a model where policyholders moral standards
depend on the attitude of insurers who may nitpick claims and sometimes deny them if
possible.
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7 The credibility issue
In a situation where there are many opportunist policyholders, it is essen-
tial for insurers to credibly announce that a tough monitoring policy will
be enforced, with a high probability of claim verication and a high level
of scrutinity for suspected fraud. In the model introduced in the previous
section, this was reached by announcing that claims are audited with proba-
bility ep(t; P ). However, since auditing is costly to the insurer, a commitment
to such a tough audit policy may not be credible.
In the absence of commitment, i.e., when the insurer has no Stackelberg
advantage in the audit game, the auditing strategy of the insurer is con-
strained to be a best response to opportunistsfraud strategy, in a way simi-
lar to tax compliance games38 studied by Graetz et al. (1986) and Melumad
and Mookherjee (1989).39 In the model introduced in the previous section,
under no commitment to audit policy, the outcome of an audit game (t; P; )
corresponds to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, where: (a) the fraud strategy
is optimal for an opportunist given the audit policy, (b) the audit policy is
optimal for the insurer given beliefs about the probability of a claim to be
fraudulent, (c) the insurers beliefs are obtained from the probability of loss
and opportunists strategy using Bayesrule.
Let n(t; P; ) and pn(t; P; ) be the equilibrium strategy of opportunists
and of insurers respectively, in an audit game in the absence of commitment
to an audit policy and let Cn(t; P; ) be the corresponding expected cost.
Proposition 11 Without commitment to an audit policy, the equilibrium of
an audit game (t; P; ) is characterized by40
pn(t; P; ) = 0 and n(t; P; ) = 1 if c > c1(t; );
pn(t; P; ) = ep(t; P ) and n(t; P; ) = c
(1  )(t  c) if c > c1(t; );
Cn(t; ) = min

t[ + (1  )]; t
2
t  c

;
where
c1(t; ) =
(1  )t
(1  ) +  :
38See Andreoni et al. (1998) for a survey on tax compliance.
39Cummins and Tennyson (1994) analyze liability claims fraud within a model without
Stackelberg advantage for insurers: each insurer chooses his fraud control level to minimize
the costs induced by fraudulent claims.
40We assume t > c and we neglect the case c = c1(t; ). See Picard (1996) for details.
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The proof of Proposition 11 may be sketched as follows. Let  be the
probability for a claim to be fraudulent. Bayesrule gives
 =
(1  )
(1  ) +  : (35)
Once a policyholder puts in a claim, the (conditional) insurers expected
cost is
C = p[c+ (1  )t] + (1  p)t: (36)
The equilibrium audit policy minimizes C with respect to p which gives
p = 0 if t < c;
p 2 [0; 1] if t = c;
p = 1 if t > c:
9=; (37)
The equilibrium of the no-commitment audit game is a solution (; p; ) to
(32), (35) and (37). Let us compare Proposition 11 to Proposition 9. At a no-
commitment equilibrium, there is always some degree of fraud:  = 0 cannot
be an equilibrium strategy since any audit policy that totally prevents fraud
is not credible. Furthermore, we have c1(t; ) < c0(t; P; ) for all t; P;  which
means that the optimal audit strategy p = ep(t; P; ) that discourages fraud
is optimal for a larger set of contracts in the commitment game than in the
no-commitment game. Lastly, we have Cn(t; )  Cc(t; P; ) with a strong
inequality when the no-commitment game involves p > 0 at equilibrium.
Indeed, at a no-commitment equilibrium, there must be some degree of fraud
for an audit policy to be credible which increases insurance expected cost.41
The analysis of market equilibrium follows the name logic as in the com-
mitment case. Let
(tn; P n) = Arg Maxt;PfU(W   L+ t  P ) + (1  )U(W   P )
s.t. P  Cn(t; P; )
be the pooling contract that maximizes the expected utility of honest poli-
cyholders.42
Proposition 12 Under A; (tn; P n) is the unique market equilibrium when
the insurers cannot commit to their audit policy.
41As shown by Boyer (1999), when the probability of auditing is strictly positive
at equilibrium (which occurs when  is large enough), then the amount of fraud
(1   )n(tn; Pn; ) = c=(tn   c) does not depend on . Note that tn does not (lo-
cally) depend on  when c < c1(tn; ).
42We assume that (tn; Pn) is a singleton.
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The expected utility of honest policyholders is higher at the commitment
equilibrium than at the no-commitment equilibrium. To highlight the welfare
costs of the no-commitment constraint, let us focus attention on the case
where  is su¢ ciently large so that, in the absence of claimsverication,
honest customers would prefer not to take out an insurance policy than to
pay high premiums that cover the cost of systematic fraud by opportunists.
This means that point C is at the origin of the axis in Figures 8 and 9, which
occurs if   , with
 =
[U 0(W   L)  U 0(W )]
U 0(W   L) + (1  )U 0(W ) 2 (0; 1):
In Figure 10, the commitment equilibrium is at point B (i.e.,  < ) and
the no-commitment equilibrium is at the origin of the axis: the market shuts
down completely at t = tn = 0.43
Figure 10
Hence, besides the inevitable market ine¢ ciency induced by the cost of
auditing (i.e., going from A to B in Figure 10), the inability of insurers to
commit to an audit policy induces an additional welfare loss (from B to 0).
How can this particular ine¢ ciency be overcome? Two solutions have been
put forward in the literature. A rst solution, developped by Melumad and
Mookherjee (1989) in the case of income tax audits, is to delegate author-
ity over an audit policy to an independant agent in charge of investigating
claims. An incentive contract o¤ered by the insurer to the investigator could
induce a tough monitoring strategy, and precommitment e¤ects would be
obtained by publicly announcing that such incentives have been given to the
investigator. Secondly, Picard (1996) shows that transferring audit costs to
a budget balanced common agency may help to solve the commitment prob-
lem. The common agency takes charge of part of the audit expenditures
decided by insurers and is nanced by lump-sum participation fees. This
mechanism mitigates the commitment problem and may even settle it com-
pletely if there is no asymmetric information between the agency and the
insurers about audit costs. Thirdly, Krawczyk (2009) shows that putting the
43It can be shown that tn > L when there is some audit at equilibrium, that is when
 > . Boyer (2004) establishes this result in a slightly di¤erent model. Intuitively,
increasing t over L maintains the audit incentives at the right level for a lower fraud
rate , because we should have t = c for p = ep(t; P ) 2 (0; 1) to be an optimal choice
of insurers. In the neighbourhood of t = L, an increase in t only induces second-order
risk-sharing e¤ects, and ultimately that will be favorable to the insured.
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insurer-policyholder interaction in a dynamic context reduces the intensity
of the commitment problem. More specically, he nests insurer-policyholder
encounters into a supergame with a sequence of customers. Using the folk
theorem for repeated games with many short-lived agents (see Fudenberg et
al.,1990), he shows that the capacity of an insurer to develop its reputation
for "toughness" and deter fraud depends on the observability of its auditing
strategy. Under full observability of the mixed auditing strategy, fraud can
be fully detered, provided the insurersdiscount factor is large enough, i.e.
they are su¢ ciently patient. More realistically, if policyholders base their
decisions on sampling information from the past period, then only partial
e¢ ciency gains are possible and the larger the size of the sample of observed
insurer-policyholder interactions, the lower the frequency and thus the cost
of fraud. Hence, signalling claims monitoring e¤ort to policyholders should
be part and parcel of the struggle against insurance fraud.
8 Using fraud signals
When there is a risk of fraud, it is in the interest of insurers to use signals
on agentslosses when deciding whether a costly verication should be per-
formed. This leads us to make a connection between optimal auditing and
scoring techniques.
We will start with the simple case where the insurer perceives a binary
signal s 2 fs1; s2g when a policyholder les a claim. The signal s is observed
by the insurer and it cannot be controlled by defrauders. Let qfi and q
n
i be,
respectively, the probability of s = si when the claim is fraudulent (i.e., when
no loss occurred) and when it corresponds to a true loss, with 0 < qn2 < q
f
2
and qn1 + q
n
2 = q
f
1 + q
f
2 = 1. Thus, we assume that s2 is more frequently
observed when the claim is fraudulent than when it corresponds to a true loss
: s2 may be interpreted as a fraud signal that should make the insurer more
suspicious. The decision to audit can now be conditioned on the perceived
fraud signal. Let us rst assume that the insurer can commit to its auditing
strategy. bpi 2 [0; 1] denotes the audit probability when signal si is perceived,
with bp = (bp1; bp2). ep(t; P ) still denotes the audit probability that deters
opportunistic individuals from ling fraudulent claims. If qf2  ep(t; P ), then
fraud is detered if bp2  ep(t; P )=qf2 and bp1 = 0. If qf2 < ep(t; P ), the fraud is
detered if bp2 = 1 and bp1 = [ep(t; P ) qf2 ]=(1 qf2 ) < 1. In other words, we here
assume that the insurers auditing strategy prioritizes the claims with signal
s2. If auditing these claims with probability one is not enough for fraud to be
deterred, then a proportion of the claims with signal s1 are also audited. We
will check later that such a strategy is optimal. For the sake of brevity, let us
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consider here the case where the optimal constract is such that qf2 > ep(t; P ).
Expected insurance cost IC and expected audit cost AC are now written as
IC = t[ + (1  )(1  bp2qf )];
AC = bp2c[qn + (1  )qf ];
with unchanged denitions of ; ; ; c and t. As in Section 6, the insurer
may decide either to deter fraud by opportunistic individuals - he would
choose bp1 = 0; bp2 = ep(t; P )=qf2 2 (0; 1) - or not (bp1 = bp2 = 0). When fraud is
detered, we have  = 0 and the cost of a claim is
C = (t+ bp2cqn2 ) = [t+ ep(t; P )cqn2
qf2
]:
Thus, under commitment to audit policy with fraud signal s, the expected
cost in an audit game (t; P; ) isbCc(t; P; ) = minft[ + (1  )]; [t+ ep(t; P )cqn2
qf2
]g:
qn2 =q
f
2 < 1 implies bCc(t; P; )  Cc(t; P; ), with a strong inequality when
detering fraud is optimal. We deduce that conditioning auditing on the
fraud signal reduces the claims cost, and ultimately it increases the expected
utility of honest individuals for the optimal contract44.
The previous reasoning may easily be extended to the more general case
where the insurer perceives a signal s 2 fs0; s1; :::; s`g with `  2, following
Dionne et al. (2009).45 Let qfi and q
n
i be respectively the probability of the
signal vector s taking on value si when the claim is fraudulent and when it
corresponds to a a true loss, with
P`
i=1 q
f
i =
P`
i=1 q
n
i = 1: Without loss of
generality, we assume qni > 0 for all i and we rank the possible signals in such
a way that46
qf1
qn1
<
qf2
qn2
< ::: <
qf`
qn`
:
44As before, the optimal contract maximizes the expected utility of honest policyholders
under the constraint P  bCc(t; P; ), where  still denotes the proportion of opportunist
individuals in the population. If the optimal contract without fraud signal is such that
[t+ ep(t; P )c qn2
qf2
] < t[ + (1  )] < [t+ ep(t; P )c]; then auditing claims is optimal only if
the insurer can condition his decision on the fraud signal.
45As in Dionne et al. (2009), s may be a k-dimensional signal, with k the number
of fraud indicators (or red ags) observed by the insurer. Fraud indicators cannot be
controlled by defrauders and they may make the insurer more suspicious about fraud. For
instance, when all indicators are binary, then ` = 2k and s may be written as a vector of
dimension k with components 0 or 1 : component j is equal to 1 when indicator j is "on",
and it is equal to 0 when it is "o¤".
46Of course if qni = 0 and q
f
i > 0, then it is optimal to trigger an audit when s = si
because the claim is denitely fraudulent in that case.
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With this ranking, we can interpret i = 1; :::; ` as an index of fraud
suspicion. Indeed, assume that the insurer consider that a claim may be
fraudulent with (ex ante) probability a. Then, using Bayes law allows us to
write the probability of fraud (fraud score) conditional on signal si as
Pr(Fraud jsi ) = q
f
i 
a
qfi 
a + qni (1  a)
;
which is increasing with i. Thus, as index i increases so does the probability
of fraud.47
Now the insurers auditing strategy is written as bp = (bp1; bp2; :::bp`) wherebpi 2 [0; 1] denotes the audit probability when signal si is perceived. Fraud-
ulent and non-fraudulent claims are audited with probability
P`
i=1 q
f
i bpi andP`
i=1 q
n
i bpi respectively. Opportunistic individuals are detered from defraud-
ing if
P`
i=1 q
f
i bpi  ep(t; P ) and in that case the expected cost of a claim is
written as the sum of the indemnity t and the expected audit cost c
P`
i=1 q
n
i bpi.
Thus, the optimal fraud detering audit strategy bp = (bp1; bp2; :::bp`) minimizes
the expected cost of claims
t+ c
X`
i=1
qni bpi;
subject to X`
i=1
qfi bpi  ep(t; P );
0  bpi  1 for all i = 1; :::; `:
This is a simple linear programming problem, whose optimal solution is
characterized in the following Proposition :
Proposition 13 An optimal auditing strategy is such thatbpi = 0 if i < i;bpi 2 (0; 1] if i = i;bpi = 1 if i > i;
47In the present model, insurers fully deter fraud when they can commit to their auditing
strategy and the proportion of opportunist individuals is large enough. This is no longer
true when there is a continuum of types for individuals. Dionne et al. (2009) consider
such a model, with a continuum of individuals and morale costs that may be more or less
important. In their model, there is a positive rate of fraud even if insurers can commit
to their audit strategy. a would then correspond to the equilibrium fraud rate, which is
positive, but lower than the equilibrium fraud rate under the no-commitment hypothesis.
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where i 2 f1; :::; `g, and when fraud is detered the audit probability is
pc(t; P ) 
X`
i=1
qni bpi < ep(t; P ):
Proposition 13 says that an optimal verication strategy consists in audit-
ing claims when the suspicion index i exceeds the critical threshold i. Thus,
the insurer plays a "red ags strategy" : for some signals - those with i > i
- claims are systematically audited, wheras there is no audit when i < i
and audit is random when i = i.48 Choosing bpi = ep(t; P ) for all i = 1; :::; `
is a suboptimal fraud detering strategy. Thus, using fraud signals allow to
audit a smaller fraction of claims while detering fraud. The expected cost
per policyholder isbCc(t; P; ) = minft[ + (1  )]; [t+ cpc(t; P )]g
with pc(t; P ) < ep(t; P ). Thus, we have bCc(t; P; )  Cc(t; P; ), with a strong
inequality when it is optimal to deter fraud, which shows that insurers can
reduce the cost of claims by triggering audit on the basis of fraud signals.
Let us turn to the case where insurers cannot commit to their auditing
strategy, and once again let us start with a binary signal s 2 fs1; s2g with
0 < qn2 < q
f
2 .
49 The insurers auditing strategy should then be the best
response to the opportunistic policyholdersfraud strategy.  still denotes
the fraud rate of opportunistic individuals and the proportion of fraudulent
claims  is still given by (35). Let us focus once again on the case where
qf2 > ep(t; P ), so that it is possible to deter fraud by auditing claims under
signal s2, with bp1 = 0. Assume rst bp2 > 0. The expected cost of a claim is
C = (1  ) (t+ cqn2 bp2) +  t  (t  c)qf2 bp2 ;
which extends (36) to the case where the audit probability di¤ers between
fraudulent claims and non-fraudulent claims. As in Section 7, there cannot
exist an equilibrium where fraud would be fully detered : indeed  = 0 would
give  = 0 and bp2 = 0 and then  = 1 would be an optimal fraud strategy of
opportunistic individuals, hence a contradiction. When  = 1, we necessarily
have qf2 bp2  ep(t; P ), and (35) then gives
 =
(1  )
(1  ) +   :
48If ` = 2 and detering fraud is optimal, then we have i = 2 if qf2  ep(t; P ) and i = 1
if qf2 < ep(t; P ).
49This case has been studied by Schiller (2003).
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Assume qf2=q
n
2 > c(1  )=(t  c). In that case, minimizing C with respect
to bp2 2 [0; 1], with  = , would give bp2 = 1, and thus qf2 bp2 > ep(t; P )
which contradicts  = 1. Thus  2 (0; 1) is the only possible case, which
implies bp2 = ep(t; P )=qf2 2 (0; 1) and  2 (0; ). For C to be minimized atbp2 = ep(t; P )=qf2 2 (0; 1), we need to have
 =
cqn2
cqn2 + (t  c)qf2
;
which implies C = t and
C =
C
1  
=
t[cqn2 + (t  c)qf2 ]
(t  c)qf2
:
When bp2 = 0, we have C = t[ + (1   )]. Thus, when the insurer cannot
commit to its audit strategy, the expected cost in an audit game (t; P; ) is
bCn(t; ) = minft[ + (1  )]; t[cqn2 + (t  c)qf2 ]
(t  c)qf2
g:
Using qn2 < q
f
2 yields bCn(t; )  Cn(t; ), with a strong inequality when it is
optimal to audit claims with positive probability. Thus, conditioning audit
on fraud signals reduces the cost of claims even if the insurer cannot commit
to its verication strategy.
If the insurer perceives a signal s 2 fs0; s1; :::; s`g with qfi =qni increasing
in i, then the expected cost of a claim is
C = (1  )
 
t+ c
X`
i=1
qni bpi
!
+ 
 
t  (t  c)
X`
i=1
qfi bpi
!
;
The optimal auditing strategy minimizes C with respect to bp = (bp1; bp2; :::bp`)
subject to 0  bpi  1 for all i = 1; :::; `. We deduce that bpi = 0 for all i if
 = 0. If  > 0, then we have :
bpi = 0 if qfi
qni
<
c(1  )
(t  c) ;
bpi 2 [0; 1] if qfi
qni
=
c(1  )
(t  c) ;
bpi = 1 if qfi
qni
>
c(1  )
(t  c) :
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Since qfi =q
n
i is increasing in i, we deduce that the characterization given in
Proposition 13 is also valid in the no-commitment case. Audit is triggered
when a suspicion index i is reached, where i is the smallest index i such that
qfi =q
n
i  c(1 )=(t c). As in the case of a binary signal, there cannot exist
an equilibrium where fraud would be fully detered. Thus, we have  > 0, and
there is some fraud at equilibrium. The ex ante fraud probability a coincides
with the proportion of fraudulent claims . The larger the suspicion index,
the larger the fraud score Pr(Fraud jsi ) = qfi =(qfi  + qni (1   ), and audit
should be triggered when this fraud score is larger than c=t.
9 Some indirect e¤ects of insurance contracts
on fraud
As mentioned in Section 6, the intensity of insurance fraud may depend on
the perception of unfair behavior on the part of insurance companies, in
relation to some stipulations of insurance contracts. For instance Dionne
and Gagné (2001) have shown with data from Québec that the amount of
the deductible in automobile insurance is a signicant determinant of the
reported loss, at least when no other vehicle is involved in the accident, and
thus when the presence of witnesses is less likely. This suggests that the larger
the deductible, the larger the propensity of drivers to le fraudulent claims.
Although a deductible is a clause of the insurance contract that cannot be
interpreted as a bad faith attitude of the insurer, the result of Dionne and
Gagné sustains the idea that the larger the part of an accident cost born by
a policyholder, the larger the incentives he or she feels to defraud. In the
same vein, the results of an experimental study by Miyazaki (2009) shows
that higher deductibles result in weaker perception that claim padding is
an unethical behavior, with the conclusion that the results indicate "some
degree of perceived corporate unfairness, wherein consumers feel that the
imbalance in favor of the rm has to be balanced by awarding the claimant
a higher dollar amount".
Independently of induced e¤ects on moral standards, some contractual
insurance provisions may prompt dishonest policyholders to defraud and in
that case, the risk of fraud should be taken into account in the design of
optimal insurance policies. An example is provided by Dionne and Gagné
(2002) through their analysis of replacement cost endorsement in automobile
insurance. A replacement cost endorsement allows the policyholder to get a
new car in the case of a theft or if the car has been totally destroyed in a road
accident, usually if the theft or the collision occured in the rst two years of
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ownership of a new car. Such endorsements increase the protection of the
insureds against depreciation, but they also increase the incentives to defraud,
for instance by framing a fraudulent theft. Note that, in an adverse selection
setting, an individual may choose to include a replacement cost endorsement
in his coverage because he knows he will be more at risk. Furthermore,
individuals may decide to drive less carefully or pay less attention to the risk
of theft when their coverage is complete than when it is partial and thus,
replacement cost endorsements may increase the insurance losses because of
moral hazard. Thus, the fact that policyholders with a replacement cost
endorsement have more frequent accidents or thefts may be the consequence
of fraud, but it may also reect adverse selection or moral hazard. Dionne
and Gagné (2002) use data from Québec to disentangle these three e¤ects.
They show that holders of car insurance policies with a replacement cost
endorsement have a higher probability of theft near the end of this additional
protection (which usually lasts for two years after the acquisition of a new
car). Their statistical tests rule out (ex ante) moral hazard and adverse
selection50 and they interpret their result as the e¤ect of replacement cost
endorsement on the propensity to defraud.
Another example of induced e¤ects of contracts on the propensity to
defraud occurs in the case of corporate property insurance. Following the ac-
cidental destruction of productive assets (e.g., buildings, plant, inventories),
a rm must decide whether to restore those assets to their previous state
and the contractual indemnity usually di¤ers according to whether there is
restoration or insurance payment. In such a setting, Bourgeon and Picard
(1999) characterize the optimal corporate re insurance contract when the
insured rm has private information about the economic value of the dam-
aged productive assets. They show that the indemnity should be larger in
case of restoration than when the rm receives insurance money, but there
should be partial coverage as well when restoration is chosen. The structure
of indemnity payments is chosen to minimize the rent the rms enjoy when
the (unveriable) economic losses are smaller than the insurance payment,
but also to prevent the rm from ine¢ cient restoration (i.e., restoration when
the economic value of the damaged capital is low). In this context, fraud may
take the form of arson : arson may be decided on by dishonest rms that
are in a position to set unprotable equipment on re to obtain insurance
money. The possibility of arson is an additional motive for lowering insur-
50Moral hazard is ruled out because there is no signicant e¤ect of replacement cost
endorsements on partial thefts (i.e., thefts where only a part of the car is stolen : hubcaps,
wheels, radio,etc.) although the same self-protection activities a¤ect the claims distribu-
tion of total and partial thefts. Dionne and Gagné (2002) also rule out adverse selection
because the e¤ect is signicant for only one year of ownership and not for all years.
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ance money under the restoration indemnity. Bourgeon and Picard (1999)
show that, because of the risk of arson, the insurer may be led not to o¤er
any insurance money to the rm but only to reimburse restoration costs.51
Experience rating, and particularly bonus-malus rules, may alleviate the
propensity of opportunistic policyholders to defraud. Bonus-malus pricing in
automobile insurance is usually viewed either as a risk type learning process
under adverse selection or as an incentive device under moral hazard. How-
ever bonus-malus also a¤ects the propensity to defraud when the mere fact
of ling a claim, be it fraudulent or not, leads the insurer to charge higher
rates in future periods. Bonus-malus rules may thus be of aid for reduc-
ing insurance fraud. This intuition has been developed by Moreno et al.
(2006). The key ingredient of their model is the intertemporal choice of poli-
cyholders. For simplicity, they assume that at period t individuals only care
about their utility during the current and following period t and t + 1, and
not about subsequent periods t + 2; :::. (which is an extreme form of non-
exponential discounting) and at each period a loss of a given size may occur.
An opportunity for fraud exists when no loss occurs and the policyholder
may fraudulently report a loss to the insurer. The insurer does not audit
claims, but simply pays out on any led claim. However the period follow-
ing a claim, the insurer adjusts the premium according to whether or not a
claim was led. Thus, ling a fraudulent claim results in a present benet
to the policyholder at the cost of a higher future premium. Moreno et al.
(2006) show that this trade-o¤ may tip in favor of honesty, in the cases of a
monopolist insurer and of a perfectly competitive markets, and they exhibit
a condition for the bonus-malus anti-fraud mechanism to Pareto dominate
the audit mechanism.
10 Collusion with agents
In many cases, insurance fraud goes through collusion between policyholders
and a third party. For instance, collusion with auto mechanics, physicians
or attorneys is a channel through which an opportunist policyholder may
manage to falsify his claims. Falsication costs taken as exogenous in the
sections 3 and 4 then are the outcome of hidden agreement between poli-
cyholders and such agents.
51Bourgeon and Picard (1999) also consider stochastic mechanisms in which the restora-
tion of damaged assets is an option given by the insurance contract to the insurer but not
always carried out at equilibrium. The (randomly exercised) restoration option is used as
a screening device : larger indemnity payments require larger probabilities of restoration,
which prevents rms with low economic losses from building up their claims.
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In this section, we focus on collusion between policyholders and agents
in charge of marketing insurance contracts. We also consider another type
of fraud, namely the fact that policyholders may lie or not disclose relevant
information when they take out their policy.52 We will assume that the
agent observes a number of characteristics of the customer that allow him
to estimate correctly the risks and to price the policy. These characteristics
cannot be veried by the insurer. Agents also provide promotional services
that a¤ect the demand for the policies o¤ered by the insurer but promotional
e¤ort cannot either be veried by the insurer.53 The insurer only observes two
signals of his agents activity, namely net premiums written and indemnity
payments.
The key element we want to focus on is the fact that agents may be willing
to o¤er unduly advantageous contracts to some policyholders in order to
compensate low promotional e¤orts. This possibility should lead the insurer
to condition his agentscommissions at the same time on cashed premiums
and on indemnity payments. Of course, the issue of how an insurer should
provide incentives to his selling agents be they exclusive or independant is
important independently of insurance fraud. However, in a situation where
the insurer does not perfectly monitor his agents, there is some scope for
collusion between agents and policyholders which facilitates insurance fraud.
The agent may be aware of the fact that the customer tells lies or that he
conceals relevant information but he overlooks this violation in order not
to miss an opportunity to sell one more insurance policy. Hence, in such a
case, the defrauder is in fact the policyholder-agent coalition itself. In what
follows, we sketch a model that captures some consequences of insurance
fraud through collusion between policyholders and agents.
Consider an insurance market with n risk-neutral rms of equal size. Each
rm employs ` exclusive agents to sell insurance contracts.54 Let e be the
promotional e¤ort expended by an agent. Let k be the loading factor used
to price the policies written by the agent. For any customer, the agent is
supposed to be able to correctly estimate the expected indemnity payments
Et. Let bk be the loading factor decided upon by the insurer. Hence, if
52On this kind of fraud where insurers can (at some cost) verify the policyholderstypes,
see Dixit (2000), Dixit and Picard (2003) and Picard (2009).
53The choice of distribution system a¤ects the cost to the insurers of elicitating ad-
ditional promotional e¤ort of their sales force. For instance, exclusive representation
prevents the agents from diverting potential customers to other insurers who pay larger
commissions. Likewise giving independent agents ownership of policy expirations provides
incentives for agents to expend e¤ort to attract and retain customers see Kim et al.
(1996).
54Modelling promotional e¤ort in an independent agency system would be more complex
since, in such a system, the agents decisions are simultaneously a¤ected by several insurers.
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expected indemnity payments are truthfully reported by the selling agent
to the insurer, the pricing rule should lead the agent to charge a premium
(1+bk)Et. However, by misreporting expected indemnity payments, the agent
is able to write policies with an actual loading factor lower than bk. In what
follows, e and k are the decision variables of the agent.
Let P and Q be respectively the aggregate premiums collected by a given
agent and the aggregate indemnity payments made to his customers during
a period of time. We assume
P =
1
n`
[g(e; k) + "1] with g0e > 0 and g
0
k < 0 (38)
where "1 is an idiosyncratic random parameter that varies among agents, with
E"1 = 0. "1 is unknown when the selling agent chooses e and k and cannot be
observed by the insurer. Larger promotional e¤orts increase the amount of
collected premiums. Furthermore, we assume that the elasticity of demand
for coverage (in terms of expected insurance demand) with respect to loading
1+ k is larger than one. Hence a higher loading factor or, equivalently, less
downward misreporting of expected insurance payments by the agent to the
insurer decreases the premiums cashed. Note that the coe¢ cient 1=n` in
(38) reects the market share of each agent. We also have
Q =
1
n`

h(e; k) +
"1
l + k
+ "2

(39)
where h(e; k)  g(e; k)=` + k, with h0e > 0; g0k < 0 and where "2 is another
idiosyncratic random parameter, uncorrelated with "1, such that E"2 = 0.
Let 	(e) be the cost to the agent of providing promotional e¤ort at level
e, with 	0 > 0;	00 > 0. The agents are supposed to be risk-averse.
If insurers were able to monitor the promotional e¤ort and to verify the
expected indemnity payments of the policies written by their agents, they
would be in position to choose e and k so as to maximize their expected
prot written as
E = `[EP   EQ  EC]
where C denotes the commission paid to each agent. Under perfect informa-
tion about the agents behaviour it is optimal to pay xed commissions so
that net earnings C 	(e) are equal to a given reservation payment normal-
ized at zero. We thus have C = 	(e), which gives
E =
1
n
[g(e; k)  h(e; k)]  `	(e) (40)
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MaximizingE with respect to e and k gives the rst best solution e = e and
k = k. A free entry perfect information equilibrium is dened by E = 0
which gives an endogenously determined number of rms n = n.
Assume now that the insurers do not observe the promotional e¤ort ex-
pended by the agents. They can neither verify the expected indemnity pay-
ments associated with the policies written by their agent. Opportunist pol-
icyholders would like to purchase insurance priced at a loading factor lower
than bk by not disclosing relevant information about the risks incurred to the
insurer. It is assumed that this hidden information cannot be revealed to the
insurer if an accident occurs. The agent observes the risks of the customers
but he may choose not to report this information truthfully to the insurer
in order to get larger sales commissions. The insurer may control the agent
opportunism by conditioning his commissions both on cashed premiums and
on indemnity payments. However, because of the uncertainty that a¤ects
premiums and losses, risk premiums will have to be paid to selling agents
which will ultimately a¤ect the rms protability.
Assume that the commission paid to an agent depends linearly on P and
Q, i.e.
C = P   Q+ 
Assume also that the agentsutility function V is quadratic, which allows
us to write
EV = EC   V ar(C) 	(e) with  > 0
The agents participation constraint EV  0 is binding at the optimum,
which gives
EC = V ar(C) + 	(e)
=

(n`)2

221 + 
2 ()
2
1
(1 + k)2
+ 222

where 21 = V ar("1) and 
2
2 = V ar("2). We obtain
E =
1
n
[g(e; k)  h(e; k)]  `	(e)  
n2`

221 + 
2 
2
1
(1 + k)2
+ 222

The insurer maximizes E with respect to e  0; k  0;  and  subject
to the agents incentive compatibility constraint
(e; k) 2 Arg Maxe0;k0EV =

n`
g(e0; k0)  
n`
h(e0; k0) +   	(e0)
  
(n`)2

221 + 
2 
2
1
(1 + k0)2
+ 222

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If there is some positive level of promotional e¤ort at the optimum, the
incentive compatibility constraints implies  > 0 and  > 0. In words, the
insurers should condition the sales commissions at the same time on collected
premiums and on indemnity payments. Because of the risk premium paid to
the agent, the expected prot of the insurer is lower than when he observes
e and k. The equilibrium levels of e and k also di¤er from their perfect
information levels e and k. Lastly, at a free entry equilibrium, the number
of rms in the market is lower than when the insurer has perfect information
about his agents activity.
Insurance fraud through collusion between policyholders and agents may
also occur in the claims settlement phase, particularly in an independent
agency system. As emphasized by Mayers and Smith (1981), independent
agents usually are given more discretion in claims administration than ex-
clusive agents and they may intercede on the policyholders behalf with the
companys claims adjuster. Inuencing claims settlement in the interest of
their customers is all the more likely that independent agents may credibly
threat to switch their business to another insurer.
Claims fraud at the claims settlement stage may also go through more
complex collusion schemes involving policyholders, agents and adjusters. Re-
jesus et al. (2004) have analyzed such collusion patterns in the US Federal
Crop Insurance Program. Here the policyholders are farmers and the loss is
the di¤erence between the actual yield at harvest and the guaranteed yield
specied in the insurance contract. Farmers may collude with agents and ad-
justers to manipulate the size of the loss in order to increase the indemnity.
An agent is paid a percentage of the premiums from all insurance policies
he sells. An adjuster is paid on the basis of the number of acres he adjusts.
Farmers, agents and adjusters have two possible types : they may be honest
or dishonest. Only dishonest individuals may collude. Dishonest agents can
potentially have customers from two populations (honest and dishonest farm-
ers), while honest agents only sell policies to honest producers. Thus, the
main benet of collusion to dishonest agents is the chance to have a larger
customer pool. Both honest and dishonest adjusters can work for honest
and dishonest agents. However a dishonest adjuster can work for a dishon-
est agent on all of his policyholders (both honest and dishonest). On the
contrary, an honest adjuster can only work on the dishonest agents honest
policyholders, but not the dishonest policyholders. Therefore, a dishonest
adjuster has a larger customer base. Thus the opportunity to adjust more
acres and earn more money is the main benet of collusion to adjusters.
Rejesus et al (2004) consider various patterns of collusion, including "col-
lusion with intermediary", nonrecursive collusion and bilateral collusion. The
"cart wheel" model of collusion is an example of collusion with intermedi-
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aries. It is based on the principle of linked actions going from a central group
of conspirators (the "cart wheel" hub) to many actors (the "rim") through
a network of conspiracy intermediaries (the "spokes" in the wheel). Rejesus
et al (2004) report that, according to compliance investigators of the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the structure of collusion in the
Federal Crop Insurance Program is congured as such a cart wheel conspir-
acy, where agents may be the hub, adjusters may be the spokes and farmers
may be the rim. Agents, adjusters and farmers may also be linked to one
another nonrecursively, contrary to the cart wheel model where there is an
intermediary that links the two other actors. Furthermore, collusion may
also exist between two individuals rather than three.
The authors use data of the USDAs Risk Management Agency (RMA)
to ag anomalous individuals55. They show that the pattern of collusion that
best ts the data is the nonrecursive scheme. Hence, coordinated behavior
between the three entities seems to be the most likely pattern of collusion.
The second best pattern of collusion is the collusion with intermediary, where
the farmer is the link to both the agent and the adjuster. An example of
this type of collusion pattern is the "kickback" scheme, in which a farmer
initiates two separate side-contracts with the adjuster and the agent and
where he promises them kickbacks from fraudulent claims. The results of
Rejesus et al (2004) are in contrast to the RMA investigatorsbelief that
the most prevalent pattern of collusion is where the adjuster is the one who
initiates and coordinate the collusion as in the above description of the cart
wheel pattern.
11 Collusion with service providers
Claims fraud may go through collusion between policyholders and service
providers (e.g., car repairers, hospitals, etc). During the two last decades,
concentration in the insurance market and in the markets for related services
went along with the creation of a¢ liated service providers networks. This
includes managed care organizations for health insurance (such as HMO and
PPO in the US) or Direct Repair Programs (DRP) for automobile insur-
ance. Insurance companies may choose to have a restrained set of a¢ liated
service providers for various reasons, including decreasing claims handling
55Rejesus et al (2004) use indicators of anomalous outcomes. Some of them are applica-
ble to the three types of agents (e.g., the indemnity/ premium ratio), others are specic
to agents (e.g., the fraction of policies with loss in the total number of policies sold by the
agent) or to adjusters (e.g., the indemnity per claim for the adjuster divided by average
adjusted claims in the county).
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costs, monitoring providers more e¢ ciently or o¤ering more e¢ cient incentive
schemes to providers; see particularly Gal-Or (1997), and Ma and McGuire
(1997),(2002) in the case of managed health care.
Bourgeon et al. (2008) have analyzed how service providers networks may
act as a device to ght claims fraud, when there is a risk of collusion between
providers and policyholders56.They limit attention to a simple setup of a dou-
ble vertical duopoly with two insurance companies and two service repairers.
Providers compete on a horizontally di¤erentiated market modelled as the
Hotelling line (providers are not valued the same by policyholders) where
they have some market power because of the imperfect substituability of
their service. Insurers are perceived as potentially perfectly substitutable by
individuals, but they may require their customers to call in a specic provider
(say a car repairer) in case of an accident. Two main a¢ liation structure are
considered. In the case of non-exclusive a¢ liation (Figure 11), customers
of both insurance companies are free to choose their providers, while under
exclusive a¢ liation (Figure 12), insurance companies are attached to their
own providers57. When there is no risk of collusion between providers, exclu-
sive a¢ liation allows to transfer some market power from the di¤erentiated
providers to the undi¤erentiated insurers, and that transfer will be a disad-
vantage for the customers. In this case, Bourgeon et al. (2008) show that
exclusive a¢ liation is the most likely structure that may emerge in such a
setting, with a negative e¤ect on the customers welfare and higher insur-
ersprot. Hence, if the government gives more social value to the insureds
welfare (in terms of wealth certainty equivalent) than to insurersprot, then
it should prevent insurers to restrict access to providers.
Figure 11
Figure 12
Providers and policyholders may collude to le fraudulent claims. We may
for instance think of a car repairer who would facilitate fraudulent claiming
by certifying that a policyholder actually needed a repair, although that
was not the case. Such a collusion may be detered through auditing. Let
us assume that providers are risk-neutral. Collusion will be detered if the
expected gains obtained by a provider from a collusive deal (i.e. the fraction
56See also Brundin and Salanié (1997).
57Bourgeon et al. (2008) also consider the case of common a¢ liation in which insurers
insurers choose the same provider as their unique referral, and the case of asymmetric
a¢ liation in which one insurer is a¢ liated with one single provider while customers of the
other insurer are free to call in the provider they prefer.
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of the insurance indemnity he would receive) is lower than the expected nes
he would have to pay if audit reveals collusion. Thus, collusion proofness may
lead insurers to reduce their coverage in order to decrease the collusion stake,
hence a welfare loss for risk-averse policyholders. Bourgeon et al. (2008) show
that in a one-shot setting this collusion-proofness condition does not modify
the previous conclusion : the defence of the policyholdersinterests may still
legitimately lead the government to prohibit exclusive a¢ liation regimes.
Matters are di¤erent when insurers and providers are engaged in a repeated
relationship. In such a setting, a provider is detered from colluding with a
customer if his loss in case of an audit is su¢ ciently large and the threat of
retaliation credible. Assume insurers o¤er insurance contracts that would not
be collusion-proof in a one-period framework. Under non-exclusive a¢ liation,
retaliation against a malevolent provider is possible only if insurers agree to
punish him simultaneously in the future periods, say by excluding him from
their networks or by switching to collusion-proof insurance contracts for all
policyholders who would choose this provider58. This would require a high
degree of coordination between insurers. The situation is di¤erent under
exclusive a¢ liation. In particular, if an insurer comes back to collusion-
proof contracts after a fraud has been detected (while its competitor does not
modies its o¤er), then its providers future prot is reduced. When providers
put su¢ ciently large a weight on future prots, i.e., when their discount factor
is large enough, this threat destroys the incentives to collude, even if the
probability of detecting collusion is low or when the nes imposed on revealed
defrauders are low. In other words, exclusive a¢ liation may complement
imperfect auditing. It may also supplement an ine¢ cient judicial system,
where defrauders can easily avoid being strongly ned because insurers have
di¢ culty providing strong evidence in court.
Note nally that detering collusion between policyholders and service
providers may not be optimal if some providers are collusive while some are
honest. Indeed, if insurers cannot distinguish collusive providers from honest
ones, they must either separate them through self-selection contracts or o¤er
collusion-proof contracts to all providers. Both solutions involve distortions
in ressource allocation. Alger and Ma (2003) consider such a model, with
two types of providers. If the insurer is unable to screen providers by o¤ering
them a menu of self-selection contracts, then collusion is tolerated if and only
if the provider is collusive with a su¢ ciently low probability.59
58Indeed, under non-exclusive a¢ liation, if there is only one insurance company (the one
that has detected collusion) that excludes the defrauder from its network or that switches
to collusion-proof contracts, then insureds will move to its competitor and the malevolent
provider will not be a¤ected.
59Alger and Ma (2003) do not obtain the same result when the insurer can use menus
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12 Conclusion
Although the theory of insurance fraud is far from being complete, this sur-
vey allows us to draw some tentative conclusions. Firstly, insurance fraud
a¤ects the design of optimal insurance policies in several ways. On the one
hand, because of claimsmonitoring costs, an optimal contract exhibits non-
verication with constant net payouts to insureds in the lower loss states
and (possibly random) verication for some severe losses. In some cases, a
straight deductible contract is optimal. On the other hand, the possibility
for policyholders either to manipulate audit costs or to falsify claims should
lead insurers to o¤er contracts that exhibit some degree of coinsurance at the
margin. The precise form of coinsurance depends on the specication of the
model. For instance, it may go through a ceiling on coverage or through over-
compensation for small losses and undercompensation for large losses. How-
ever, the fact that insurers should not be o¤ered policies with full insurance at
the margin seems a fairly robust result as soon as they may engage in costly
activities that a¤ect the insurers information about damages. Secondly, in-
surance fraud calls for some cooperation among insurance companies. This
may go through the development of common agencies that build data bases
about past suspicious claims, that develop quantitative method for better
detecting fraudulent claims60 and that spread information among insurers.
In particular data bases may help to mitigate the ine¢ ciency associated with
adverse selection, that is with the fact that insurers are unable to distinguish
potential defrauders from honest policyholders. Cooperation among insurers
may also reduce the intensity of the credibility constraints that a¤ect an-
tifraud policies. Free-riding in antifraud policies could be analyzed along the
same lines and it also calls for more cooperation among insurers. Thirdly,
insurance fraud frequently goes through collusion with a third party, be it an
insurance agent or a service provider. Contractual relationships between in-
surers and these third parties strongly a¤ects the propensity of policyholders
to engage in insurance fraud activities. In particular, conditioning sales com-
missions paid to agents on a loss-premium ratio results from a compromise
between two objectives: providing incentives to make promotional e¤ort and
detering collusion with customers. Risk premiums borne by agents are then
an additional cost of the distribution system, which ultimately a¤ects the
e¢ ciency of insurance industry. Preventing collusion between a policyholder
and his own agent is a still more di¢ cult challenge. Vertical integration of
these agents by insurance companies (for instance through a¢ liated auto-
of contracts.
60See Derrig and Ostaszewski (1995), Artis et al. (1999), Viaene et al. (2002).
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mechanics networks) is likely to mitigate the intensity of collusion in such
cases.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Let
et(x) = Supft(x); t(y); y 2M cg;
t0 = Inffet(x); x 2 [0; x]g;fM = fx j et(x) > t0g;eP = P:
Obviously, the contract e = fet(:);fM; ePg is incentive compatible. Hence e
and  yield the same insurance payment.
Let bx(x) be an optimal claim of the policyholder under  when he su¤ers
a loss x. Let x0 2 fM . We then have et(x0) > et(x1) for some x1 in [0; ex]. This
gives bx(x0) 2 M , otherwise bx(x0) would be a better claim than bx(x1) under
 when x = x1. Audit costs are thus lower under e than under .
Proof of Lemma 2 61
Let
L = U(W   P   x+ t(x))f(x) + [t(x) + c] if x 2M
be the Lagrangean, with  a multiplier associated with the non-negative ex-
pected prot constraint. When P; t0 andM are xed optimally, the schedule
t(:) :M ! R+ is such that
@L
@t
= U 0(W   P   x+ t(x))f(x)  f(x) = 0:
This allows us to write
t(x) = x  k for all x 2M;
where k is a constant.
Assume there exist 0  a1 < a2 < a3 < a4  x such that
[a1; a2) [ (a3; a4] M;
(a2; a3) M c:
61This proof follows Bond and Crocker (1997).
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Let
M = M   f[a1; a2) [ (a3; a4]g
M c = M
c   [a2; a3]
We have
EU =
Z
M
U(W   P   k)dF (x) +
Z
M
U(W   P   k + t0)dF (x)
+
Z a2
a1
U(W   P   k)dF (x) +
Z a3
a2
U(W   P   k + t0)dF (x)
+
Z a4
a3
U(W   P   k)dF (x) (41)
and
E = P  
Z
M
(x  k + c)dF (x) 
Z
Mc
t0dF (x)
 
Z a2
a1
(x  k + c)dF (x) 
Z a3
a2
t0dF (x)
 
Z a4
a2
(x  k + c)dF (x) = 0: (42)
Di¤erentiating (42) with respect to a2 and a4 gives
da3 =
(a2   k + c  t0)f(a2)da2
a3   k + c  t0
which implies
dEU = f(a2)(t0   a2 + k   c)da2
with
 =
U(W   k   P )  U(W   P   a3 + t0)
a3   k   t0 + c  
U(W   k   P )  U(W   P   a2 + t0)
a2   k   t0   c
The concavity of U guarantees that  > 0. Furthermore a2   k  t0 since
[a1; a2) M . We thus have dEU > 0 if da2 < 0.
Proof of Proposition 1
Let us delete the constraint (6). We may check that it is satised by the op-
timal solution of this less constrained problem. Assigning a multiplier   0
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to the non-negative prot constraint, the rst-order optimality conditions on
k; P and m are respectively
[1  F (m)][U 0(W   P   k)  ] = 0 (43)Z m
0
U 0(W   x  P )dF (x) + [1  F (m)]U 0(W   P   k) =  (44)
U(W  m  P )f(m+)  U(W   P   k)f(m+) + (c+m  k)f(m+)
 0
= 0 if m > 0 (45)
(43), (44) and F (m)  f(0) > 0 for all m  0 give
U 0(W   P   k) = 1
F (m)
Z m
0
U 0(W   x  P )dF (x)
which implies 0 < k < m if m > 0 and k = 0 if m = 0.
Assume m = 0. Substituting k = m = 0 in (45) then gives cf(0+)  0,
hence a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2
The rst-order optimality conditions on k; P and t0 are respectively
[1  F (m)][U 0(W   P   k)  ] (46)
f(0)U 0(W P )+
Z m
0+
U 0(W x P+t0)dF (x)+[1 F (m)]U 0(W P k) = 
(47)Z m
0+
U 0(W   x  P + t0)dF (x) = [F (m)  f(0)] (48)
(46), (47), (48) and F (m)  f(0) > 0 for all m  0 give k = 0 and  =
U 0(W   P ). Using (48) then yields
[F (m)  f(0)]U 0(W   P ) =
Z m
0+
U(W   x  P + t0)dF (x)
which implies 0 < t0 < m if m > 0.
Consider m as a xed parameter. Let (m) be the optimal expected
utility as a function of m. The envelope theorem gives
0(m) = U 0(W  m  P + t0)f(m)  U(W   P   k)f(m)
+(t0 + c+m  k)f(m)
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if m > 0. When m! 0, then t0 ! 0. Using k = 0 then gives
limm!00(m) = cf(0+) > 0
which implies m > 0 at the optimum.
Proofs of Proposition 3 and 5. See Picard (2000).
Proof of Proposition 4 and 6. See Bond and Crocker (1997).
Proof of Proposition 7. See Mookherjee and Png (1989) and Fagart and
Picard (1999).
Proof of Proposition 8. See Fagart and Picard (1999).
Proof of Proposition 9 to 12. See Picard (1996)
Proof of Proposition 13
Optimality conditions are written as
bpi = 1 if cqni   qfi < 0;bpi 2 [0; 1] if cqni   qfi = 0;bpi = 0 if cqni   qfi > 0;
where  is a Lagrange multiplier. i is the smallest index i in f1; :::; `g such
that qfi =q
n
i  c=.
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Figure 1: Characterization of incentive compatible contracts
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Figure 3: Optimal insurance coverage under deterministic auditing when the
insurer can observe whether an accident has occured but not the
magnitude of the actual loss
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Figure 4: Optimal no-manipulation contract in the Bond-Crocker (1997) model
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Figure 5: Optimal insurance contract and auditor’s contingent fees
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Figure 6: Equilibrium indemnification under costly state falsification
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Figure 7: Optimal insurance contract under random auditing when U(.) is CARA
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Figure 8: The market equilibrium is at point B when θ > θˆ
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Figure 9: The market equilibrium is at point C when θ < θˆ
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Figure 10: Case where the market shuts down at no-commitment equilibrium
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